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Abstract Higher order store programs are programs which store, manipulate and
invoke code at runtime. Important examples of higher order store programs include
operating system kernels which dynamically load and unload kernel modules. Yet
conventional Hoare logics, which provide no means of representing changes to code
at runtime, are not applicable to such programs. Recently, however, new logics
using nested Hoare triples have addressed this shortcoming.
In this paper we describe, from top to bottom, a sound semi-automated verifi-
cation system for higher order store programs. We give a programming language
with higher order store features, define an assertion language with nested triples
for specifying such programs, and provide reasoning rules for proving programs
correct. We then present in full our algorithms for automatically constructing cor-
rectness proofs.
In contrast to earlier work, the language also includes ordinary (fixed) pro-
cedures and mutable local variables, making it easy to model programs which
perform dynamic loading and other higher order store operations. We give an op-
erational semantics for programs and a step-indexed interpretation of assertions,
and use these to show soundness of our reasoning rules, which include a deep frame
rule which allows more modular proofs.
Our automated reasoning algorithms include a scheme for separation logic
based symbolic execution of programs, and automated provers for solving various
kinds of entailment problems. The latter are presented in the form of sets of derived
proof rules which are constrained enough to be read as a proof search algorithm.
Keywords Program verification, higher order store, recursion through the store,
separation logic, automated verification
1 Introduction
Separation logic [37] is a Hoare-style logic for reasoning about heap-manipulating
programs, which extends Hoare logic with connectives and rules for local reasoning.
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Local reasoning allows much simpler proofs of heap-manipulating programs, such
as those working with linked lists and trees. As a result, the past decade has seen
an explosion of interest in separation logic. Separation logic proofs were initially
done by hand, but automated tools soon followed, beginning with Smallfoot [4].
Smallfoot provided (semi-)automatic reasoning about C-like recursive procedures,
concentrating on memory safety and simple shape properties. The key idea behind
Smallfoot, which has been reused and refined in later tools (see e.g. [17,20,21,30]),
is that of symbolic execution with separation logic [5].
However, in the original separation logic, and hence all the tools based on it,
assertions only allowed one to talk about heaps storing primitive data types such
as integers and Booleans, and the code of the program was assumed to be fixed. In
Reynolds’ seminal paper [37], the treatment of code pointers in separation logic is
mentioned as an open problem. Programs which introduce or modify procedures
(or code or commands) on the heap at runtime were thus left unaddressed. Yet
many interesting kinds of programs fall into this category: “hot update” systems
which update code while it runs (e.g. [43]), programs which use dynamic loading
and unloading of code (such as the Linux kernel [24]), and programs which perform
runtime code generation (e.g. [2]). Heaps which contain procedures (or code or
commands) have been called higher order stores.
Reynolds’ open problem has first been addressed by [33] for machine languages
and [36] for a C-like language. After that, following ideas of [26], separation logics
with nested Hoare triples [40,42,41] have been developed. In these logics, asser-
tions can contain Hoare triples which describe the behaviour of code stored on
the program’s heap allowing one to reason modularly about higher order store
programs.
In this paper we take a natural next step by showing how to combine the
symbolic execution idea, which has proved so effective for ordinary procedural
programs, with nested Hoare triples. This allows us to build a (semi-)automatic
verifier for higher order store programs, which we have named Crowfoot. In doing
this, several challenges present themselves. Firstly, because assertions now include
triples i.e. specifications, we need to create an automatic prover for entailments
between specifications, as well as a prover for entailments between assertions. In
existing tools only the latter is needed. Secondly, new symbolic execution rules
are required for the statements which make use of the higher order nature of the
heap; obviously these rules make use of nested triples. Thirdly, when nested triples
are added, one may have both ∀ and ∃ quantifiers appearing at all nesting levels,
and these demand a proper treatment; quantifiers can no longer be sidestepped
the way they are in e.g. [5]. Fourthly, one wishes to support deep framing to allow
more modular proofs, which means one needs to include support for (at least some
uses of) the deep framing operators ⊗ and ◦ [40,41], which do not appear in logics
without nested triples.
Running example. Figure 1 presents an example program that uses stored proce-
dures and involves a generic memoiser. The command eval [a](e) is used to call
stored code, more precisely it evaluates the content of cell a and if it points to a
function it then applies this function to arguments e. If the number of parameters
does not match or no function is stored at a the program evaluation gets stuck.
The safety and correctness of the program in Figure 1 can be expressed within
our logic (specifications will be presented in Section 3) and a proof can be found by
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the proof search algorithms we implement. The proof is almost automatic, however
it requires some hints which are the grey shaded parts in the figure. These are
annotations for the verifier and are not part of the program code. They will be
explained in Section 2.3.2.
Our example concerns a recursive implementation fib of the Fibonacci function,
which makes its recursive calls through the store using code stored at address a.
Since the “internal” recursive calls are made via a pointer into the store, we can
“hook into” the recursion and provide a memoisation routine mem, which also
caches these internal calls. This kind of memoisation cannot be implemented for
a conventional recursive implementation of the Fibonacci function. Our example
is more challenging than the factorial function which is typically used [26,3,16] to
illustrate recursion through the store.
The memoisation procedure mem first looks to see if it can find a cached result
for the given input. If found, then the cached result is given, otherwise the recursive
procedure f is used to compute the result, which is then added to the cache. The
caching is achieved with the help of an association list library (implementation
omitted) which is first initialised in main by the call to load list lib. This results
in a set of pointers to procedures that manipulate association lists, which are
then passed through to the useFib procedure where the memoiser is set up and a
Fibonacci number calculated.
The procedure useFib first creates a new association list and then stores the
fib procedure on the heap. Next the memoiser is loaded onto the heap which is
set up for the loaded fib procedure and the new association list, along with the
pointers to the list library code. By providing these arguments at the time of
storing the procedure on the heap, they are then fixed by partial application such
that running the stored version of mem (by eval [a](a, n)) requires providing just the
two remaining arguments. The first is a pointer to itself, which is passed through
to the function being memoised where it is used for the recursive calls, and the
second argument is the input integer.
A short description of this (semi-)automatic verifier and its logic has appeared
in [14]. In this article we give an improved and extended presentation, adding
significant amount of detail and some additional features. In detail we additionally
provide:
– all the deterministic proof search rules of Crowfoot exactly how they have been
implemented
– all the high-level rules of separation logic for nested triples which are a minor
variation of [41]
– a detailed soundness proof of the logic wrt. high-level core rules
– a short soundness proof of the high-level core rules wrt. a step-indexed model
inspired by [7] and different from [41]. The model is also different from the one
sketched in [14] allowing one to model some features not originally discussed.
– a number of additional proof hint mechanisms that were needed for verification
of a reflective visitor implementation [28].
Structure of this paper The rest of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2
we introduce a language for (annotated) higher order store programs, and a lan-
guage of assertions for reasoning about them. Unlike the language used in [41], our
programming language supports three natural features: fixed recursive procedures,
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const res;
proc fib(a, n) {
locals p, q, k;
if n ≤ 0 then {
[res] := 0;
ghost fold $Rel(n, 0)
} else {
if n = 1 then {
[res] := 1;
ghost fold $Rel(?, ?)
} else {
k := n− 2;
eval [a](a, k); p := [res];
k := n− 1;
eval [a](a, k); q := [res];
[res] := p+ q;
ghost fold $Rel(n, p+q)
}}}
proc mem(lookupL, addL, createL,
disposeL, al , f, a, n) {
locals found , b, v;
ghost unfold $S(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);
found := new 0;
eval [lookupL](al , n, found , res);
b := [found ]; dispose found ;
if b = 0 then {
ghost fold $S(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);
eval [f ](a, n);
ghost unfold $S(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);
v := [res]; eval [addL](al , n, v)
} else { skip };
ghost fold $S(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) }
proc useFib(lookupL, addL, createL,
disposeL) {
locals al , a, f, n;
f := new 0;
al := new 0;
eval [createL](al);
[f ] := proc fib( , ) deepframe DeepInv ;
a := new 0;
[a] := proc mem(lookupL, addL, createL,
disposeL, al , f, , );
ghost fold $S(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);
n := 31337;
eval[a](a, n);
ghost unfold $S(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);
ghost unfold $ListLibWeak(?, ?, ?, ?);
eval [disposeL](al);
dispose a; dispose f ; dispose lookupL;
dispose addL; dispose createL;
dispose disposeL; dispose res
}
proc main() {
locals lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL;
lookupL := new 0; addL := new 0;
createL := new 0; disposeL := new 0;
call load list lib(lookupL, addL,
createL, disposeL);
ghost unfold $ListLibStrong(?, ?, ?, ?);
ghost fold $ListLibWeak(?, ?, ?, ?);
call useFib(lookupL, addL,
createL, disposeL)
}
proc load list lib(lookupL,
addL, createL, disposeL) {. . .}
Fig. 1 Our running example program. (DeepInv is defined in Figure 4.)
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integer variables x, fixed procedure names F , integer literals n, declared constants c
address expr eA ::= x | c | x+ n | x+ c
value expr eV ::= n | x | c | eV ./ eV where ./ ∈ {+,−,×}
statement C ::= skip | At | C;C | if eV ./c eV then C else C
| while eV ./c eV do C where ./c ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤}
argument t ::= x | c
atomic statement At ::= x := eV | x := [eA] | [eA] := eV | [eA] := [eA]
| x := new eV + | dispose eA | call F(t∗)
| eval [eA](t∗) | [eA] := proc F([t| ]∗)
Fig. 2 Abstract syntax for program statements.
mutable local variables and partial application. The specification of our running
example, the memoiser, is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the high-level
(“core”) rules for reasoning about programs with higher-order store. These are
an adaptation of the rules of [40], made to fit our programming language. Their
soundness is then shown using a model based on step-indexing in Section 5. This
model also allows us to use a mildly simplified rule for recursion through the store.
Our automated proof search algorithms are described in Section 6. We present our
methods in the form of sets of proof rules which are algorithmic in nature; essen-
tially these rules can be read as a proof search algorithm. We show that these rules
are sound by deriving them from those of Section 4. In Section 7 we briefly discuss
related work and Section 8 contains a short report about our experience with the
Crowfoot tool, a verifier based on the symbolic execution rules presented in this
paper. Finally, Section 9 concludes by discussing future work.
2 Programming language and assertion language
2.1 Programming language featuring higher order store
We work with an imperative language with recursive procedures, call-by-value
parameter passing, and dynamic memory allocation via a mutable heap supporting
address arithmetic and, crucially, higher order store operations. Procedure bodies
are program statements, whose abstract syntax is given in Figure 2.
Square brackets are used for dereferencing addresses, so x := [a] reads the
content at address a into the variable x, whereas [a] := x stores the value of x at
address a in the heap.
For using the higher-order store, there are two important statement forms.
Statements like [a] := proc F(x, ) are used to load code onto the heap, optionally
instantiating some of the parameters at load-time. In this case, the fixed proce-
dure named F is stored at address a. F has two parameters, the first of which
is instantiated with x (partial application). The stored procedure will then have
arity 1. We use an underscore for those parameters that are to be given at invo-
cation time. As our syntax uses to represent arguments not yet “filled in”, we
can supply any subset of the arguments at load-time, not just initial segments.
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set variables α, predicate names P
element expressions eE ::= eV | (eE+) | eS
set expressions eS ::= α | eS ∪ eS | {eE} | projn(eS) | ∅
behavioural spec. B ::= ∀[x|α]∗. {P} · (t∗){Q}
content spec. C ::= eV | | B
atomic formula A ::= eA 7→ C+
| P (eV ∗; eS∗) | eV = eV | eV 6= eV
| eE ∈ eS | eE /∈ eS | eS ⊆ eS | eS = eS
spatial conjunction Φ,Θ, Υ ::= A ? Θ | emp
assertion disjunct Ψ ::= ∃[x|α]∗.Θ
assertion P,Q ::= false | Ψ ∨ P
Fig. 3 Abstract syntax for the assertion language
The other important statement is eval [eA](t1, . . . , tn), which lets us run the code
stored in cell eA with actual parameters t1, . . . , tn.
Note that the syntax is slightly restrictive, for example there is no ÷ opera-
tor, procedure arguments can only be variables, and the address expressions limit
pointer arithmetic to two simple cases of addition. However, these issues are or-
thogonal to the focus of this research, which is to support reasoning for higher-
order store programs, and the verification system presented should be considered
a research prototype.
2.2 Assertion language
The syntax for the assertion language used in our automatic proof search al-
gorithms can be seen in Figure 3. We extend the logic [40] which already uses
separation logic primitives: predicate emp for the empty heap, e1 7→ e2 for a one
cell heaplet with address e1 and its content e2, and ? for adding two heaplets
with disjoint addresses. Our extended language allows nested triples to appear in
assertions, such that we can reason about stored procedures. For example, the
assertion
x 7→ ∀a. {a 7→ } · (a) {a 7→ }
states that the content at address x is a procedure of arity 1 which, for all ar-
guments a, satisfies the given Hoare triple {a 7→ } · {a 7→ }. A further addition
to the logic of [40] are the introduction of set and element expressions. Element
expressions eE are one of the following: either the usual (integer) expressions eV ,
or tuples of elements expressions, eg. (e1, e2, e3) or set expressions. Set expressions
eS are either: a set variable α, the union of two set expressions, a singleton element
set (thus sets can be nested), the n-th projection of a set expression, projn(eS),
or the empty set ∅. Projections map sets of tuples to sets by lifting the standard
projection map pin to sets in the canonical way, for instance proj2({(e1, e2, e3)}
equals {e2}.
We could easily extend the available operations and relations on sets, adding
for example intersections or inequalities of sets.
Figure 3 explains at the syntax for atomic formula A. The first case describes
a heaplet (ie. a single cell heap). The single cell has address eA pointing to a list
of contiguous cells (in concrete syntax separated by commas) which are speci-
fied using one of the following content specifiers: an expression eV describing some
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integer content, an underscore specifying that any content will suffice, or a be-
havioural specification B stipulating that the cell contains a procedure satisfying
Hoare triple B that also indicates the number and kind of arguments1. Other
ways to obtain atomic formulae are usages of predicates P with integer and set
arguments separated by a comma, comparison between (integer) expressions, and
logical expressions involving sets. The latter comprise elementhood test, negated
elementhood test, subset relationship between sets, and equality between sets.
Spatial conjunctions allow one to describe larger heaps using repeatedly A?. . .,
terminating this process using the empty heap predicate emp. An assertion then
consists of a disjunction of existentially quantified spatial conjunctions.
A key feature of the assertion language in Figure 3 is that only certain kinds of
formulae are allowed; the use of logical connectives and quantifiers must follow a
particular pattern. Restricting the assertion language like this is a standard tech-
nique when building formal verification tools: it increases the degree of automation
one can achieve, at the expense of the expressiveness of the specifications one can
consider. With the restrictions we adopt in Figure 3 (which are similar to those
used in Smallfoot [4], for example) we are able to program an effective automatic
entailment prover in a fairly natural way. We do not include spatial implication,
i.e.. the so-called “magic wand”. The main reason is simplicity as first-order separa-
tion logic with full usage of magic wand is undecidable. Techniques to circumvent
this problem in practice and to support magic wand in (semi-)automated proofs
have been suggested by [9,39] and could be also used to extend the Crowfoot logic.
A sound and complete proof system for separation logic with magic wand has been
recently presented in [31] which “may also serve as practical foundation” (loc.cit.)
for verifiers.
A formula is called pure if it does not use 7→ and contains either no predicate
symbols P, or only predicate symbols defined by pure formulae. Thus pure for-
mulae do not refer to the heap. In Section 4.2, we give a slightly non-standard
interpretation to the pure formulae, additionally requiring the heap to be empty;
e.g. x = y holds exactly when x and y are equal and the heap is empty. We do this
(following again [4]) so that our restricted assertion language needs only one kind
of conjunction, ?; it needs not include ∧.
2.3 Annotated programs
Annotated programs are written using the programming and assertion languages
given in the previous sub-sections.
2.3.1 Declarations
An annotated program is a sequence of declarations, which can be of the following
kinds:
– Constant definition: const c or const c = n
– Abstract predicate declaration: forall P( ∗; ∗) or forall pure P( ∗; ∗)
Predicates declared as abstract may be used in specifications, but have no def-
inition (so they cannot be folded or unfolded). Thus a successful proof shows
1 Recall that arguments t can be a variable x or constant c.
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that the program works for any definition of such predicates. This feature pro-
vides only a “hint” of second-order logic: universal quantification over predi-
cates is possible if the scope is the entire input file. Abstract predicates can
optionally be declared pure, which means they can be duplicated and discarded
in assertions. This would not be sound for general abstract predicates.
– Inductive/recursive predicate declaration: recdef P(x∗;α∗) := P
The following, for example, declares a linked list segment predicate that ap-
pears frequently in the separation logic literature:
recdef Lseg(x, y;α) := x = y ∗ α = ∅
∨ ∃n, d, β. x 7→ d, n ∗ Lseg(n, y;β) ∗ α = {(d, x)} ∪ β
(1)
Predicates are implicitly regarded as pure if their definition does not refer to the
heap (as defined in Section 2.2). One can also declare specifications designed
for reasoning about recursion through the store, such as
recdef R(x) := x 7→ ∀a. {R(x) ? y 7→ } · (a) {R(x) ? y 7→ }
The importance of such (mixed variant) recursive predicate definitions will be
discussed in detail when the proof rule is discussed that deals with recursion
through the store.
The well-definedness of a recursively defined predicate, ie. whether it seman-
tically exists, is not checked. To warrant maximum flexibility, our tool does
not guarantee this and leaves the existence proof to the user. Thus, it is the
user’s responsibility to write recursive predicate declarations that are actually
meaningful.2 This is similar in spirit to the way admissibility was handled in
LCF [23] where admissibility itself had to be proved outside the LCF logic.
– Declaration using the invariant extension operator, discussed in more detail in
Section 2.4:
recdef S(x) := R(y) ◦ Ψ
where y ⊆ x and fv(Ψ) ⊆ x. This means in particular that Ψ must not intro-
duce new free variables, however it can introduce new existentially quantified
variables. The (deep) invariant extension operator ◦, presented in [40], has the
effect of deeply framing an invariant onto the predicate. This involves adding
the invariant Ψ to the definition of R, and further adding the assertion as an
invariant to all nested specifications. In short, S(x) = (R(y)⊗ Ψ) ? Ψ .
– (Abstract) procedure declaration:
proc abstract F(x∗)
∀ [x|α]∗.
pre : P
post : Q
proc F(x∗)
∀ [x|α]∗.
pre : P
post : Q
{ locals x∗;C }
This declares a (possibly abstract) procedure, and associates with it a speci-
fication consisting of a pre- and postcondition. Formal parameters are taken
2 We could implement a semantic checker that verifies that the declaration is actually an
instance of a certain pattern that guarantees existence but decided against it for maximum
flexibility as our verifier is a research tool.
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as implicitly universally quantified3. We disallow assignments to formal pa-
rameters in the procedure body, so that these have the same meaning in the
postcondition as in the precondition. Abstract procedures have a specification
but no body, and are useful when we wish to model library procedures for
which we know the behaviour but do not know or do not care about the source
code.
2.3.2 Hints
To assist the prover in verifying a program, certain hints can be provided. Firstly,
while-loops are annotated with an invariant:
statement C ::= . . . | while eV ./ eV P do C
The next kind are annotations to some of the atomic statements, defined in
Section 2.1.
atomic statement At ::= . . . | call F(t∗) inst-hints∗ deepframe?
| eval [eA](t∗) inst-hints∗
| [eA] := F([t| ]∗) deepframe?
inst-hints ::= x = eV | α = eS
deepframe ::= deepframe Ψ
The ‘inst-hints’ annotation, used with the call and eval statements, provides
optional hints on how to instantiate quantified variables over the relevant spec-
ification. For example if the specification of the procedure we are going to eval
is ∀a, b, c. {P} · (a) {Q} we might use hint “b = e” which will instantiate b with
expression e. With no hints for the variable c, the system will attempt to com-
pute a suitable instantiation. The optional deepframe annotation, which consists
of the keyword deepframe followed by an assertion disjunct, allows deep framing
of an invariant to take place on the triple being used or stored onto the heap, see
Section 2.4.
The final kind of annotations are the ghost statements, added to the atomic
statements:
atomic statement At ::= . . . | ghost G
ghost statement G ::= fold P((x|?)∗; (α|?)∗) inst-hints?
| unfold P((x|?)∗; (α|?)∗)
| split P x ((eV |?)+) | join P x
These annotations, interspersed with program statements in the procedure bodies,
tell the verifier when it is necessary to fold or unfold the user-defined predicates.
For example, a standard linked-list definition would need to be unfolded if we
want to examine the contents, or traverse the list. The split and join statements
are special cases that are explained in the next section.
3 Only other variables thus need to be explicitly quantified by the user.
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2.3.3 List segments
Linked lists are a widely used heap data structure so it is important to be able
to reason about list segments. For greater flexibility we work with a general pat-
tern of list segment definitions which can be syntactically recognised. For all such
definitions an axiom for joining list segments will be available, and for definitions
which are splittable (explained shortly) an axiom for splitting list segments is ad-
ditionally available. These can be used via ghost statements to perform inductive
list reasoning in proofs.
Let
LsegDefs(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
be the set consisting of the following (syntactic) predicate definitions:
recdef P(s, t;α) := s = t ? α = ∅ ∨

∃n,v, β .
s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? P(n, t, β)
? α = {(E1, . . . , Ek)} ∪ β

where:
– C1, . . . ,CM are content specifiers whose free variables come from v.
– A1, . . . , AN are atomic formulae whose free variables come from v.
– E1, . . . , Ek are value expressions whose free variables come from v, s.
– All variables appearing are distinct.
A list segment predicate as above is called splittable if one of E1, . . . , Ek is either
the variable s (which is used as the address of the first list node in the segment), or
a variable v ∈ v such that one of A1, . . . , AN has the form v 7→ C ′ . Having one of
these constraints ensures that each element in the abstract set α can be uniquely
identified.
Let us demonstrate this with the list segment predicate we saw earlier (1).
That definition is in LsegDefs(n, d, [d], [], [d, x]) and is splittable. Thus the ghost
statement “split Lseg a (x, y)” is available, and will split a list segment of shape
Lseg, which starts at address a, to break out the element (x, y). Thus, the list
is split into three parts: the list segment of all elements preceding element (x, y),
the element (x, y), and the list segment of the succeeding elements. Statement
“ghost join Lseg e” is for concatenating two such segments, taking Lseg(e1, e, eα) ?
Lseg(e, e2, eβ) and producing a joint list Lseg(e1, e2, eα ∪ eβ). The corresponding
deterministic proof rules (GhostJoin,GhostSplit) are in Figure B.2.
2.4 Deep framing
The deep frame rule [8,40] allows one to infer {P}C {Q}⊗I from {P}C {Q}, where
⊗ is a deep framing operator. Intuitively this operator adds the invariant I not
just to the pre- and postconditions of the triple {P}C {Q}, but also to all triples
nested inside P and Q, at all levels. For example,
∀x. {a 7→ {emp} · () {emp}} · (x) {emp} ⊗ y 7→
⇔ ∀x. {x 7→ {y 7→ } · () {y 7→ } ? y 7→ } · (x) {y 7→ }
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as can be proved using the distribution laws for ⊗ found in [40]. This is useful
for modular reasoning as explained in [8] and further demonstrated by our run-
ning example. The operator ◦ from [40], used in recdef definitions, is a convenient
shorthand: Φ ◦ I := (Φ⊗ I) ? I.
The annotation deepframe I prompts the verifier to add the invariant I deeply
onto the triple for a procedure; this can be done when a procedure is called with
call, or when a procedure is first written to the heap. Note that deep framing is
not available for the eval statement, as this would be unsound [15].
Our proof rules implement deep framing using the ⊗ distribution laws from
[40]. In Section 5 we will show how to distribute ⊗ through recursively defined
predicates. In our verification system we currently support this distribution oper-
ator only for specific recursive definitions of the form
R(x) :=
n
F
i=1
vi 7→ ∀ai. {R(e) ? Fi} · (pi) {R(e) ? Gi} ? H
where: e may contain variables ai as well as x, and each Fi, each Gi and H are all
left zeroes of ⊗ (i.e. informally they do not contain any nested triples). This form
is sufficient to cover all the cases we have encountered so far.
3 Specification of the running example
The specifications of the procedures in Figure 1 can be found in Figure 5. The
auxiliary predicate definitions are given in Figure 4.
The fib implementation. Let us first examine how to specify the fib code.
Predicate $Rel(n,m) says that n and m are appropriately related for the function
being computed; in this case we define $Rel(n,m) to mean that m is the nth
Fibonacci number. But this definition is only used inside the proof of fib, and
not when proving the generic components such as mem so the proof is modular.
To emphasise this we could verify the memoiser with a generic specification $Rel
using declaration forall pure $Rel(n,m). Currently there is no means of making that
“forall pure” have a scope other than global (wrt. the input file), so one cannot easily
prove that the memoiser satisfies a generic specification and verify a particular
client in the same file. But one can do both separately.
Suppose we try to write a precondition for the fib code. This precondition must
mention all the heap resources needed by fib. Firstly a cell res 7→ is needed into
which we write the result (recall that res is a global constant). Secondly, since fib
makes its recursive call through the heap at the address given by parameter a,
the precondition must include a 7→ B where B is a nested triple. In particular, B
must state that the code stored at a has the same kind of behaviour as we specify
for the fib procedure. But we do not have fib’s specification yet, because we are
still trying to formulate its precondition! It appears that we need a specification
which depends on itself. Using the recdef keyword we can declare such a recursively
defined specification, namely the $RecFn predicate, which appears nested inside
its own definition.
The memoiser. The memoiser implementation uses an association list data
structure, at address al , to cache the input-output pairs for the function be-
ing memoised. An association list with a header cell, starting at address al and
containing values for a set κ of keys, is described by $AssocListH (al ;κ). Such
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recdef $Rel(n,m) := n ≤ 0 ? m = 0 ∨ n = 1 ? m = 1
∨ ∃a, b. 2 ≤ n ? $Rel(n− 2, a) ? $Rel(n− 1, b) ? m = a+ b
recdef $RecFn(f) := f 7→ ∀n, a.
{$RecFn(a) ? res 7→ } · (a, n) {∃v. $RecFn(a) ? res 7→ v ∗ $Rel(n, v)}
recdef $ListLibStrong(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) :=
lookupL 7→ . . . ? createL 7→ . . . ? disposeL 7→ . . .
? addL 7→ ∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
? $Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
recdef $ListLibWeak(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) :=
lookupL 7→ . . . ? createL 7→ . . . ? disposeL 7→ . . .
? addL 7→ ∀al , key, value.{ ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ)
? $Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value)
{ ∃κ.
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
}
recdef $S(a, f, al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) := $RecFn(a) ◦DeepInv
where DeepInv abbreviates
∃κ.

f 7→ ∀n, a. {
$S(a, f, al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ }
·(a, n){ ∃v. $S(a, f, al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ v ? $Rel(n, v) }
? $AssocListH (al ;κ) ? $ListLibWeak(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL)

recdef $AssocList(x; τ) := x = 0 ? τ = ∅
∨ ∃next , k, v, τ ′. x 7→ k, v,next ? $Rel(k, v) ? $AssocList(next ; τ ′) ? τ = {k} ∪ τ ′
recdef $AssocListH (x; τ) := ∃y. x 7→ y ? $AssocList(y; τ)
Fig. 4 User-defined predicates used to specify and verify our running example.
lists are manipulated via four library routines, pointers to which are passed in
the arguments lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL. Argument f to procedure mem
is a pointer to the code of the function being memoised; the memoiser must
call this code when the required data is not found in the cache. The arguments
lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL, al , f are fixed by partial application when the mem-
oiser is first loaded onto the heap. This leaves a two-argument procedure: the first
argument a is passed straight through to the function being memoised, and the
second argument n is the input at which to apply the function.
The memoiser is designed to be placed into mutual recursion with fib, or similar
code for computing other functions. During computations the fib code and the
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proc main()
pre : res 7→ ;
post : emp;
proc fib(a,n)
pre : $RecFn(a) ? res 7→ ;
post : ∃v . $RecFn(a) ? res 7→ v ? $Rel(n, v);
proc mem(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL, al , f , a,n)
pre : $S(a, f , al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ ;
post : ∃m. $S(a, f , al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ m ? $Rel(n,m);
proc useFib(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL)
pre : res 7→ ? $ListLibWeak(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL);
post : emp;
proc load list lib(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL)
pre : lookupL 7→ ? addL 7→ ? createL 7→ ? disposeL 7→ ;
post : $ListLibStrong(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL);
Fig. 5 Procedure specifications for the memoiser example.
memoiser then invoke each other in a “zig-zag” mutual recursion. The “ensemble”
of these two functions stored on the heap and able to invoke each other can be
described by $S(a, f, al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) which, as will be shown
later by Lemma 7 (Section 6), is equivalent to:
∃κ. a 7→ RecFnMem(·) ? f 7→ RecFnMem(·)
? $AssocListH (al ;κ) ? $ListLibWeak(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL)
where RecFnMem(·) is shorthand for
∀a, n.
{
$S(a, f, al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ }
·(a, n){∃v. $S(a, f, al , lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ v ? $Rel(n, v)}
Intuitively RecFnMem describes code which computes a function as specified by
$Rel , provided the heap contains the “ensemble” of function and memoiser code
as described above.
The main program. The main procedure first calls load list lib to load the
association list library routines onto the heap. Then, main invokes useFib which
loads the fib code and the memoiser, places them into mutual recursion, and finally
uses this to compute the 31337th Fibonacci number.
In useFib we see the crucial role of the deep frame rule. We have specified
(and therefore will verify) fib for the case where it is placed in recursion only with
itself, using $RecFn. Hence, if the deepframe annotation were not used in useFib,
the symbolic heap after the statement [f ] := proc fib( , ) would contain
f 7→ ∀a, n. {$RecFn(a) ? res 7→ } · (a,n) {∃v . $RecFn(a) ? res 7→ v ? $Rel(n, v)}
However the annotation deepframe DeepInv triggers the application of −⊗DeepInv
to the above triple, resulting in RecFnMem(·). In this way, we have used the deep
frame rule to derive another specification for the fib code, which describes how that
code works in mutual recursion with a memoiser. We did not need to respecify or
reprove fib.
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The list library. The memoiser depends only on relatively weak properties
of the association list library; a library with these properties is specified by the
predicate $ListLibWeak . But the list library is specified with a stronger specification
$ListLibStrong so that it can also be used with other clients which need additional
guarantees. Specifications for three of the routines are omitted in Figure 4, but
with the remaining “add” routine one can see a difference. In order to compute
the correct function, the memoiser does not care whether the (key , value) pair is
actually added to the list or not, as long as whatever pairs are in the list afterwards
are suitably related by $Rel . But other clients of the list library will certainly care
about this.
Our verification will go through because our rules for proving entailments are
able to show
$ListLibStrong(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL)
⇒ $ListLibWeak(lookupL, addL, createL, disposeL) (2)
as we shall discuss in Section 6.5. Having such entailments proved automatically
facilitates reasoning when one is “plugging together” different pieces of code.
4 A “core” Hoare logic for Higher-order Store
In this section we present and discuss the Hoare logic with respect to which our ver-
ification system is sound. We refer to those rules as the “core” rules. These rules
are non-deterministic and not particularly suitable for automated proof search
but they give a high-level logic for higher-order store. In Section 6 we will discuss
judgements and rules for automated proof search and we prove that these rules are
sound w.r.t. the “core” rules presented in this section. Note that the assertion lan-
guage of this “high-level (core)” logic is richer than the assertion language of our
verifier. For instance, there are no syntactic restrictions about quantifiers in asser-
tions, conjunction and implication between assertions yields assertions, and true
is an assertion. Similarly, arguments of procedures can be arbitrary expressions.
4.1 Rules for generating verification conditions (VCs)
Because programs use mutually recursive fixed procedures, the first rule to apply
is a version of the well-knkown recursive procedure rule [25], the premise of which
generates the verification conditions for the given program. It basically says that
in order to prove a procedure correct wrt. its pre- and postcondition, we have to
prove its body correct, assuming that recursive calls of the procedure already meet
the specification.
Let F1, . . . ,Fn be the names of the concrete procedures declared in the program
with bodies body(Fi) to meet specifications {pre(Fi)}Fi(params(Fi)) {post(Fi)}
and let us abbreviate the context of these n triple specifications ΓF . Then the rule
for the correctness of those specifications with respect to the procedure declarations
is as follows:
RecursiveProcedures
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (Π;ΓA, ΓF `` {pre(Fj)} body(Fj){post(Fj)})
Π;ΓA `` {pre(Fi)}Fi(params(Fi)) {post(Fi)}
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
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where the judgement Π;Γ `` {Pi}Ci {Qi} expresses that Hoare triple {Pi}Ci {Qi} is
derivable assuming the predicate definitions Π, containing equivalences P(x)⇔ Q
which give meaning to the predicates, and procedure interface specifications Γ . In
addition to the context ΓF of triples for declared procedures we need a context
ΓA to account for any abstract procedures which of course do not have bodies.
Variables appearing in these triples need to be treated as universally quantified
around the triple (see semantics in Section 5).
4.2 Rules for proving VCs
If we have n non-abstract procedures then the rule (RecursiveProcedures) gen-
erates n verification conditions. Each VC has the form of a Hoare triple in context
Π;Γ `` {P}C {Q}, where C is a concrete command, which must be proved with
respect to some information about user-defined predicates in Π and declared pro-
cedures in Γ . To prove the verification conditions we basically use a version of the
logic in [40] with some changes that we shall shortly explain.
The rules in [40] enrich Separation Logic with rules for higher-order store.
However, the programming language used in loc. cit. is more restricted in that it
lacks the parameter passing, fixed procedures and mutable local variables available
in the language we use here. In Figure 6, we list the syntax-driven rules. The full set
of rules can be found in the Appendix A. We discuss their soundness in Section 5
and use them to prove soundness of the rather involved deterministic rules in
Section 6 that implement the proof search.
Variable naming conventions Throughout the paper we will use the following vari-
able names in rules to distinguish their kinds: name x usually denotes a program
(and thus an integer) variable (or as list of variables x); for parameter lists of
functions usually p is in use which also denotes a list of integer variables. For list
segments, s and t are used as additional integer variables. In the core logic we
also use k typically as a variable representing (the code of) a stored procedure4.
Names a, b, u, v, w and y (or as lists of variables a etc.) denote either integer or set
variables.
Expression naming conventions Similarly for expressions that can denote either sets
or integers the letter e (or e for lists of such expressions) is used (also E at times).
The names eA, eV and eS denote just address, integer value and set expressions,
respectively. For set expressions we also use sometimes eα or eβ (see the rules on
list segments in Section 2.3.3). All expressions can appear with the usual extra
decorations, so we may use e′, e1 or eˆ or even e′1 or eˆ1 in cases where several
expressions appear in one rule.
Substitution notation convention In reasoning rules we will write e[x\t] for the sub-
stitution of variable x in term e by a term t.
4 In the implemented low level logic we never use such variables explicitly.
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Explanation of Figure 6 The rules are mostly as found in other separation logic
systems, providing variable assignment, heap allocation, deallocation and address
dereferencing. The interesting rules here are those that utilise the higher-order
store: storing code on the heap, and eval. Three notable rules are discussed below.
Rule (Call) is for reasoning about declared procedures. It is worth pointing
out that the specification of the procedure is taken from the specification context
and that parameter instantiation is done implicitly in the hypothesis. The hypoth-
esis consists of an entailment between the declared specification of the procedure
and its actual invocation. The universal quantification of free variables in proce-
dure specifications becomes visible here. The entailment judgement is discussed
below. The symbolic heap before the invocation P is likely to be larger than the
procedure’s footprint A which is dealt with as usual by the frame rule.
Rule (Eval) is for reasoning about stored procedures5 and needs to deal with
recursion through the store. The invoked procedure is stored on the heap at address
eA and is supposed to fulfil the triple {P}·(eV) {Q} where P is the precondition of
the eval command. Note that there are no universally quantified variables around
this (nested) triple as parameter instantiation is done implicitly in the hypothesis
like for the (Call) rule.
Rule (StoreProc) allows the loading of a fixed procedure from the context Γ
into a single cell on the heap. The rule is complicated by the ability to use partial
application, requiring some special handling of the ∀-quantified variables and the
parameters. Essentially, the rule states that any argument provided in t, say the
i-th such argument ti, that is not the underscore, replaces any occurrences of the
i-th formal parameter in the code’s specification. That parameter is then dropped
from the parameter list, and also from the ∀-quantified variables such that it is
bound outside the nested-triple. Any argument provided in t, say the k-th such
argument tk, that equals the underscore implies that the k-th argument of the
original function remains an argument in the resulting partially applied function.
The addition of y to the ∀-variables ensures that no other variables used in the
specification will be captured.
Rules for entailments between assertions. The judgement for entailments between
assertions is
Π `` P ⇒ Q
where Π is the set of predicate definitions which give meaning to predicates in
assertions P and Q. We will often drop the Π annotation when it is irrelevant or
obvious from the context.
Besides the usual basic properties of first order logic with equality, we use the
rules as outlined in Appendix A.2 divided up in three categories. The first group
describes the usual properties of Separation Logic connectives. The second is about
the usual distribution of the tensor ⊗ used to frame on assertions “deeply” (see
[40]), and the third is about nested triple entailments. Note that in our logic the
first group also contains the axioms
?-SplitPureLeft
A ? Φ⇒ A if Φ is pure
?-SplitPureRight
A ∧ (Φ ? true)⇒ A ? Φ if Φ is pure
5 We use a version of this rule that is different from the one in [40,14] as it reflects more
closely the rule used for proof search.
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assign
{P}x := e{∃x′ . x = e[x\x′] ? P [x\x′]}
lookup{
P ? eA 7→ e′
}
x := [eA]
{∃x′ . x = e′[x\x′] ? (eA 7→ e′)[x\x′] ? P [x\x′]}
heap-assign
{e 7→ } [eA] := e′
{
eA 7→ e′
}
heap2heap-assign{
e 7→ C ? e′ 7→ } [eA] := [e′A]{eA 7→ C ? e′A 7→ C}
new
{P}x := new e{∃x′ . x 7→ e[x\x′] ? P [x\x′]} dispose{eA 7→ } dispose eA {emp}
Call
Π `` (∀y. {A} k(p) {B})⇒ {P} k(eV) {Q}
Π;Σ, {A}F(p) {B} `` {P} call F(eV) {Q}
y = fv(A,p, B) k fresh
Eval
P ⇒ eA 7→ {P} · (eV) {Q} ? true
{P} eval [eA](eV) {Q}
skip
{P} skip {P}
StoreProc
{A}F(p) {B} `` {eA 7→ } [eA] := F(t)
{
eA 7→ (∀p|U ,y. {A} · (p|U ) {B}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
}
where |t| = |p| and ti either value expression ai or ; y = fv(A,B)− p;
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X
scomp
Π;Γ `` {P}C1 {R} Π;Γ `` {R}C2 {Q}
Π;Γ `` {P}C1;C2 {Q}
if
Π;Γ `` {P ∧ eV = e′V }C1 {Q} Π;Γ `` {P ∧ eV 6= e′V }C2 {Q}
Π;Γ `` {P} if eV = e′V then C1 else C2 {Q}
while1
Π;Γ `` {I ∧ eV = e′V }C {I}
Π;Γ `` {I}while eV = e′V do C
{
I ∧ eV 6= e′V
} while2 Π;Γ `` {I ∧ eV 6= e′V }C {I}
Π;Γ `` {I}while eV 6= e′V do C
{
I ∧ eV = e′V
}
Fig. 6 Syntax-driven rules for Hoare-triples
These axioms are needed as in the assertion language of the verifier we do not use
∧ for adding pure assertions but rather ?.6 The following axiom states that pure
facts can be duplicated
?-IdemPure
Φ⇒ Φ ? Φ if Φ is pure
and can be inferred from (?-SplitPureRight) and the fact that Φ ⇒ Φ ? true
(which follows from the Separation Logic axioms).
The following rule will be used later to prove that invariant extension operator
⊗ distributes over recursive predicates (Lemma 7). It states that each recursive
definition of a predicate has a unique solution. In order for this to hold we need to
ensure that R in the rule below gives rise to a unique solution. This is not possible
6 Semantically this means that a pure assertion Φ will only hold in the empty heap. Therefore
Φ will not hold in the general sense (ie. for all heaps) but Φ ? true will.
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within the logic of the tool but left as external proof-obligation
RUnique
∀y. (R[X\P ])(y)⇔ P(y) ∀y. (R[X\Q])(y)⇔ Q(y)
∀y. P (y)⇔ Q(y) R admits a unique solution
where R is a formula denoting an assertion, with a free predicate variable X used
with the appropriate arity and admits a unique solution. This is the case, for
instance, if we R matches the pattern as described in [16] (so in particular it
cannot be X itself).
Note that with the help of ∃-Introduction on the left hand side of the implica-
tion and (Consequence) one can derive (Skolem). Both are needed to eliminate
existentially quantified variables. Both can be found in Figure 7.
For the sake of the proof search rules later, we now introduce two useful func-
tions, purify(−) and closure(−), which transform spatial conjunctions and return
spatial conjunctions. The function application purify(A1 ? · · · ? An) returns the spa-
tial conjunction of just those conjuncts Ai that are pure. The application closure(Φ)
returns Φ conjoined with some extra pure facts which are already implicit in the
spatial parts of Φ. For example if the spatial parts are x 7→ ? y 7→ 0 the pure con-
straints x 6= 0, y 6= 0 and x 6= y are added. These functions are designed to satisfy
the following characteristic properties which we will add to the list of axioms:
Purify
Φ ⇔ purify(Φ) ? Φ
Closure
Φ ⇔ closure(Φ)
Due to the syntactic nature of the functions, the above axioms can be shown by
simple induction on the structure of Φ using the laws of Separation Logic.
Rules for inductive list segment predicates. A limited form of inductive reasoning for
list segments is available by means of the following two axioms:
Join
recdef L(s, t;α) := P ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Π, (L(s, t;α)⇔ P ) `` L(e1, e, eα) ? L(e, e2; eβ)⇒ L(e1, e2; eα ∪ eβ)
Split
recdef L(s, t;α) := P ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Π, (L(s, t;α)⇔ P ) `` (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ eˆγ ? L(eˆ1, eˆ2, eˆγ)⇒
∃s, n,v, α, β.

L(eˆ1, s;α)
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, eˆ2, β)
? eˆγ = α ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ β
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek

Rules for entailments between triples about procedures. Since our logic uses nested
triples, entailment becomes more complicated and we need to prove entailments
between such triples that talk about the behaviour of procedures. The rules can
be found in Figure 7.
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ShallowFrameProcedures
{P} e(e) {Q} ⇒ {P ? R} e(e) {Q ? R}
ConsequenceProcedures
P ⇒ P ′ Q′ ⇒ Q{
P ′
}
k(eV)
{
Q′
}⇒ {P} k(eV) {Q}
Disjunction
A⇒ {Ψ1} k(eV) {Q} A⇒ {Ψ2} k(eV) {Q}
A⇒ {Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2} k(eV) {Q}
Skolem
{Φ[x\x0]} k(eV) {Q} ⇒ {∃x.Φ} k(eV) {Q}
x0 fresh
Fig. 7 Rules for entailment between behavioural specifications
5 Soundness of the logic above
To show soundness of the rules above we adopt and adapt a model and proofs that
have been presented in [7].
We will recapitulate the techniques of this “hybrid” model that uses operational
semantics and step-indexing but also denotational semantics to construct the type
of Kripke-worlds used for modelling the deep frame rule. There might be other
ways to construct models for our language but the model presented has various
advantages, including notably that it can be easily extended to include the anti-
frame rule [34,42] for future extensions of our logic. The rules in Section 6 that do
the automatic proof search are then shown sound relative to the rules above. The
main differences between the rules presented here and the ones in [40] are the use
of recursively definable procedures with (integer) parameters and local variables7
and the use of those procedures as code expressions (instead of quoted code) which
allows for partial application at the point of heap update. The main feature of the
presented model is that assertions are step-indexed predicates on heaps further
indexed by worlds representing the (specification) invariants that can be framed
on to allow for deep framing.
5.1 Operational semantics of programming language
We define a small-step operational semantics as defined in Figure 8. A configura-
tion (C, s, h) of the semantics consists of an open command C, a stack of variable
environments s ∈ Stack , and a heap h ∈ Heap. For stacks of environments s · η
refers to a stack with topmost environment η and ∅ denotes the empty stack. All
components of a configuration may change during execution. In order to deal with
procedure calls there is also a constant environment for procedure declarations γ
that is not included in the configuration as it is fixed and will not change. The
reduction relation however carries γ as superscript to indicate the dependency.
We next define the semantic domains used in configurations, that is heaps,
variable environments and procedure environments: First, the domain of heaps is
7 In our language the syntax is slightly different from loc.cit. as we declare all local variables
at the beginning of procedures instead of using the let. . . in. . . syntax and the local variables
can be updated.
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defined as
Heap = N>0 ⇀fin Z
ie. partial maps from strictly positive8 natural numbers (the addresses) to inte-
gers that have finite domain. Therefore, heaps store only integers which has the
advantage that they are “flat” and so do not need to be defined as recursive types
containing objects of higher-order, thus raising problems w.r.t. admissibility of
predicates on heaps. Despite being technically “flat” they still are “higher-order”
in spirit as we store procedures in them via a simple encoding d e. As usual, the
empty heap is abbreviated e and there is a partial binary operation h1 · h2 that
adjoins two heaps h1 and h2 if h1#h2 which abbreviates that h1 and h2 have
disjoint domains, ie. dom(h)1 ∩ dom(h)2 = ∅.
Variable environments are defined as total maps from variable names to integer
values.
Env = Var → Z
Variable names include program variable names as well as auxiliary variable names
used to express specifications. One can only quantify over auxiliary variables. There
is an update operation
η[x 7→ e](y) =
{
e if x = y
η(y) otherwise
Using total maps allows us to ignore variable declarations in the semantics. This
means our failure avoiding semantics of Hoare triples will not be able to guarantee
that programs don’t use undeclared variables. The front-end of our verifier will
only accept program and specifications where variables are correctly declared.
Finally, a procedure environment γ maps procedure names F to declarations
proc (x){locals y;C} in syntactic form.
The operational semantics is a relation that relates two configurations and a
program. A configuration consists of a stack of environments and a heap. A final
configuration is a normal configuration or a special aborting configuration abort.
This special (terminal) configuration is reached if a memory fault or any kind
of runtime error occurs, for instance if for a procedure call the actual argument
number does not match the arity of the procedure. The rules for the non aborting
cases in the operational semantics are given in Figure 8; the aborting cases can be
found in Figure 9.
In addition to the usual variable environment η that maps variables to inte-
gers, we need a stack of such environments as we use a language with procedure
blocks that have local variables. The procedure environment γ that maps proce-
dure names to their definitions is used for interpreting call statements by looking
up the corresponding procedure in the environment. Again, if the arguments do not
match the procedure’s arity, we abort. For storing procedures we need to perform
partial application. Thus we define the operation
papply (proc (x){localsy;C}) (t1, . . . , tn) = proc(x|U ){localsy;C[x|I\U\tI\U ]}
where x = (xi)i∈I , U = {i ∈ I | ti = } and x|X = (xi)i∈I∩X . This operation
substitutes those actual parameters ti of t that are not for the matching formal
8 The address 0 denotes the nil pointer.
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(x := eV , s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η[x 7→ JeV Kη ], h)
(x := [eA], s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η[x 7→ h(JeAKη)], h)
and JeAKη ∈ dom(h)
([eA] := eV , s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η, h[JeAKη 7→ JeV Kη ])
if JeAKη ∈ dom(h)
([e1] := [e2], s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η, h[Je1Kη 7→ h(Je2Kη)])
if Je1Kη ∈ dom(h) and Je2Kη ∈ dom(h)
(x := new e1, . . . , en, s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η, h · [a 7→ Je1Kη ] · [a+ 1 7→ Je2Kη ]
· . . . · [a+ n−1 7→ JenKη ])
if x ∈ dom(η) and a /∈ dom(h), . . . a+ n−1 /∈ dom(h)
(dispose e, s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η, h′)
if JeKη = n and h = h′ ∗[n 7→ v]
(call F(e1, . . . , en), s · η, h) ;γ (C; return, s · η · η[x1 7→ Je1Kη , . . . , xn 7→ JenKη ,
y1 7→ 0, . . . , ym 7→ 0], h)
if F ∈ dom(γ) and
γ(F) = proc (x1, . . . xn){locals y1, . . . , ym;C}
(return, s · η, , h) ; (skip, s, h)
(eval [eA](e1, . . . , en), s · η, h) ; (C; return, s · η · η[x1 7→ Je1Kη , . . . , xn 7→ JenKη ,
y1 7→ 0, . . . , ym 7→ 0], h)
if JeAKη ∈ dom(h) and
dJeAKηe−1 = proc (x1, . . . xn){locals y1, . . . , ym;C}
([eA] := proc F(t1, . . . , tn), s · η, h) ;γ (skip, s · η, h[JeAKη 7→ dpapply γ(F) (u1, . . . , un)e])
where ui =
{
if ti =
η(xi) if ti = xi
if JeAKη ∈ dom(h), F ∈ dom(γ), and arity (γ(F)) = n
(C1;C2, s, h) ; (C′1;C2, s′, h′)
if (C1, s, h); (C′1, s′, h′)
(skip;C2, s, h) ; (C2, s, h)
(if e1 ./ e2 thenC1 elseC2, s · η, h) ; (C1, s · η, h)
if Je1Kη ./ Je2Kη
(if e1 ./ e2 thenC1 elseC2, s · η, h) ; (C2, s · η, h)
if Je1Kη 6./ Je2Kη
(while e1 ./ e2 doC, s · η, h) ; (C; while e1 = e2 doC, s · η, h)
if Je1Kη ./ Je2Kη
(while e1 ./ e2 doC, s · η, h) ; (skip, s · η, h)
if Je1Kη 6./ Je2Kη
Fig. 8 Operational semantics of our programming language. Here ./ ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤}.
parameters xi. For those tj = the formal parameter xj is left alone such that the
resulting procedure has arity |U |. Note that because we have outlawed assignments
to formal parameters inside a procedure body, this substitution produces only well-
formed statements and cannot create “statements” like 3 := 4.
Let us define Safeγn to be the set of configurations in the operational semantics
that are “safe” for n reduction steps, meaning the set of configurations that do
not reduce to abort in n or fewer steps. Defining further;γk to be the restriction of
the operational semantics with fixed procedure environment γ to k-steps, we can
explicitly write
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(x := [eV ], s · η, , h) ; abort
if JeV Kη /∈ dom(h)
([eA] := eV , s · η, , h) ; abort
if JeAKη /∈ dom(h)
([e1] := [e2], s · η, h) ; abort
if Je1Kη /∈ dom(h) or Je2Kη /∈ dom(h)
(dispose e, s · η, h) ; abort
if JeKη /∈ dom(h)
(call F(e1, . . . , en), s · η, h) ;γ abort
if F /∈ dom(γ) or arity γ(F) 6= n
(return, ∅, h) ; abort
(eval [eA](e1, . . . , en), s · η, h) ; abort
if JeAKη /∈ dom(h) or
dJeKηe−1 6= proc (x1, . . . xn){locals y1, . . . , ym;C}
([eA] := proc F(t1, . . . , tn), s · η, h) ;γ abort
if JeAKη /∈ dom(h) or F /∈ dom(γ) or arity γ(F) 6= n
(C1;C2, s, h) ; abort
if (C1, s, h); abort
Fig. 9 Abort cases of the operational semantics of our programming language
Safeγn = {∆ ∈ Config | ¬∃k ≤ n.∆;γk abort}
5.2 Semantics of assertions including triples
Again, we follow the ideas of [7] and adapt and extend them according to our lan-
guage. The first main idea here is to use step-indexed predicates. So let UPred(H)
(for any H) be the set of subsets of N×H that are downwards closed in the index
part (first component):
{p ⊆ N×H | ∀(k, h) ∈ p. ∀j ≤ k. (j, h) ∈ p}.
For H we pick the ingredients we need to interpret assertions so
H = Env× SetEnv×Heap
where SetEnv is the domain of environments that map auxiliary set variables (α)
to sets of “element values”. Element values can be integers, but also tuples of
element values and sets of element values, ie.
Set = P(Elem) Elem = Z+ Tuple + Set Tuple =
∑
n
(Elem)n
To equip UPred(H) with a distance function we first define a restriction oper-
ator p[n] for any p ∈ UPred(H) as follows:
p[n] := {(k, v) ∈ p | k < n}
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So by definition for all predicates p and q we obtain p[0] = ∅ = q[0]. Now we can
define a distance function for UPred(H) as follows
δ(p, q) := inf{2−n | p[n] = q[n]}
which by the above observation is bounded by 1. That it is a distance map with the
right properties can be shown easily. For the ultrametric version of the triangular
inequality one needs the property
(p[n])[m] = p[min(n,m)]
Let CBUltne denote the category of complete 1-bounded non-empty ultra metric
spaces which is used to interpret predicates of our logic.
For two elements e and e′ ∈ A ∈ CBUltne we write e n= e′ for δ(e, e′) = 2−n.
As a consequence UPred(H) ∈ CBUltne, i.e. UPred(H) is a complete, 1-bounded
ultrametric space; for a proof of this see [7]. Using further results cited in loc.cit.
[Theorem 2.1] we obtain a unique W ∈ CBUltne satisfying
W ∼= 12 (W → UPred(H)) . (3)
We define Pred = 12 (W → UPred(H)) so we can denote the isomorphism from (3)
ι : Pred →W (4)
and we will refer to this ι frequently in this chapter. Assertions are to be modelled
as elements of Pred . The “shrinking factor” 12 for the metric automatically turns
the function space of non-expansive maps between CBUltnes into a space of only
contractive maps, for which then a solution of the recursive equation (3) exists up
to isomorphism [38].
The set Pred is ordered pointwise:
p ≤ q ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈W. p(w) ⊆ q(w)
As explained in the extended version of [7] we can show that Pred is a complete
BI-algebra (in the sense of [35]):
Lemma 1 (Pred is a complete BI-algebra) We can define all BI-operations:
emp(w) = {(n, η, σ, e) | n ∈ N, η ∈ Env, σ ∈ SetEnv}
(p ? q)(w) = {(n, η, σ, h) | ∃h1, h2. h = h1 · h2
∧ (n, η, σ, h1) ∈ p(w) ∧ (n, η, σ, h2) ∈ q(w)}
(p −∗ q)(w) = {(n, η, σ, h) | ∀m ≤ n.
((m, η, σ, h′) ∈ p(w) ∧ h#h′) =⇒ (m, η, h · h′) ∈ q(w)}
Proof Note that the quantification in the definition of −∗ is necessary to enforce a
downward-closed predicate. The proofs are straightforward.
The fact that Pred is a complete BI algebra immediately gives us a sound
interpretation of most of the assertions in the logic of [6], but to interpret recursive
predicates we also need to know that the operations are non-expansive:
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Lemma 2 The BI-algebra operations on Pred given by the previous lemma are non-
expansive:
·,−∗,→,∧,∨ : Pred × Pred → Pred∨
I ,
∧
I : (I → Pred)→ Pred .
(In the last two operations, the indexing set I is given the discrete metric.)
Proof For instance, ? : UPred(H) × UPred(H) → UPred(H): It suffices to show
that if p
n
= p′ and q n= q′, then also (p ? q) n= (p′ ? q′). The latter is equivalent
to ∀m < n. (m, η, σ, h) ∈ p ? q ⇐⇒ (m, η, σ, h) ∈ p′ ? q′ following easily from the
assumption and the definition of ?.
In the following, let us write > for the top element of Pred which is by definition
λw ∈W.N×H = λw ∈W.N× Env× SetEnv×Heap.
5.2.1 Interpretation of invariant extension
To interpret invariant-extension assertions P ⊗Q, we need an operator ⊗ on the set
of semantic predicates Pred . Working with metric-spaces, such a (unique) operator
can be defined using Banach’s fixed point theorem:
Lemma 3 There exists a unique function ⊗ : Pred×W → Pred in the (non-expansive)
function space of CBUltne satisfying
p⊗w = λw′. p(w ◦ w′)
where ◦ : W ×W →W is given by
w1 ◦ w2 = ι((ι−1(w1)⊗w2) · ι−1(w2)) .
Proof Both operations ⊗ and ◦ are mutually recursively defined by the above and
their fixpoints exist by Banach’s fixpoint theorem (see [41]).
5.2.2 Interpretation of triples
One notable difference w.r.t the interpretation of triples in [7,40] is that nested
triples (behavioural specs B) now have additional parameters (possibly zero).
Therefore, semantic triples now need to work on procedures instead of commands.
We define a semantic interpretation of such Hoare triples next. Recall that we
write ;γk for the k-step reduction relation of the operational semantics.
Definition 1 Let p, q ∈ Pred , w ∈ W , η ∈ Env, σ ∈ SetEnv, let C be a program
statement and let γ be a procedure environment. We define that w, η, σ |=γn (p, C, q)
holds iff the following holds: for all r ∈ UPred(H), all m < n, all heaps h, all stacks
s, if (m, η, σ, h) ∈ p(w) ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r, then:
1. (C, s · η, h) ∈ Safeγm.
2. For all k ≤ m and all h′ ∈ Heap, η′ ∈ Env, if (C, s · η, h);γk (skip, s · η′, h′), then
(m− k, η′, σ, h′) ∈ q(w) ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r.
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We write n |=γpi (P,C,Q) iff for all w ∈ W and for all set environments σ and
integer environments η it holds that w, η, σ |=γn (JP Kpi , C, JQKpi). Accordingly we
write |=γpi (P,C,Q) for ∀n ∈ N. n |=γpi (P,C,Q).
This definition is similar to the one in [40] with its use of the invariant w and
the baking-in of the first order frame rule, i.e., the quantification over r. The
difference is that the meaning is now relative to the operational semantics (rather
than denotational) using the fixed procedure declarations in γ, and that we use
step indexing to measure to what extent pre- and postconditions should hold.
This idea has also appeared in the (unpublished) appendix of [7]. Note how the
definition of |=γpi (p, C, q) universally quantifies all free variables on the top level.
The intention is, of course, that a Hoare-triple assertion is interpreted using
the above semantic construct (and this will be seen in Figure 11). The following
lemma is crucial to achieve that this definition yields a non-expansive map:
Lemma 4 If w
k
= w′ and w, η, σ |=n (p, C, q), then w′, η, σ |=min(n,k−1) (p, C, q).
Proof Straightforward verification, using Definition 1, the fact that if w
k
= w′ then
ι−1(w)(emp) k−1= ι−1(w′)(emp), the fact that the separating conjunction ? is non-
expansive on UPred(H) and the definition of the distance map (Lemma 2). It is
worth noting that to show this lemma the index m of tuples in w, η, σ |=n (p, C, q)
as given in Definition 1 above must indeed be strictly smaller than n9.
5.2.3 Interpretation of our assertion language
The interpretation of an assertion P is now defined to be an element JP Kpi in Pred ,
where pi is the environment for predicate definitions mapping predicate names (like
P) to predicates in UPred(H) of some finite arity. So pi maps predicate names to
functions mapping argument integer and set variables to a predicate in UPred(H).
How the declarations are interpreted will be discussed further below.
The definition uses the complete BI-algebra structure on Pred given earlier to
interpret the standard logical connectives, e.g.,
JP ? QKpi w = JP Kpi w ? JQKpi w.
Invariant extension is interpreted as follows:
JP ⊗QKpi w = (JP Kpi ⊗ ι(JQKη))w
It is worth mentioning that we interpret the logic of the previous Section 4
which uses a superset of the assertion language defined in Figure 3 earlier. In par-
ticular, the “extended” logic includes general universal quantification, conjunction
and implications between assertions and (stand-alone) triples as assertions. This
allows one to express implications between triples which will be used later to verify
the proof search rules for entailment (see Section 6).
The concrete interpretation of the logical connectives including implication and
triples can be found in Figure 11. Note that we need to extend the interpretation
9 This also guarantees that certain recursive definitions of predicates are contractive and thus
admit a fixpoint. The existence of recursively defined predicates is, however, not discussed here
but in [16].
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JeV Kη,σ = JeV Kη as usualq
(e1E , . . . , e
n
E)
y
η,σ
= (JeEK1η,σ , . . . , JenEKη,σ)JαKη,σ = σ(α)q
e1S ∪ e2S
y
η,σ
=
q
e1S
y
η,σ
∪ qe2Syη,σJ{eE}Kη,σ = {JeEKη}J∅Kη,σ = {}Jprojn(eS)Kη,σ = {pin(v) | v ∈ JeSKη,σ}
Fig. 10 Interpretation of expressions.
of expressions eV from the operational semantics to assertion expressions eE (in-
cluding set expressions eS) which requires the interpretation function to have an
extra argument σ for set variables. The details can be found in Figure 10. Note
that the abstract syntax already distinguishes between sets (eS) and integers (eV )
so we do not need to do any type checking. Since we use a flat store the storable
procedures (as expressions) are integers and live in eV . They could, in principle,
be used for arithmetic computations but since nothing about the encoding of pro-
cedures is axiomatised in the logic one would not be able to prove anything for
such unintended uses.
Figure 11 does not contain a clause for e 7→ as this can be viewed as an
abbreviation for ∃v. e 7→ v. Similarly Figure 11 contains no clause for e 7→ ∀x {P} ·
(y) {Q} as this can be viewed as an abbreviation for ∃c.(e 7→ c ∧ ∀x {P} c(y) {Q})
for a fresh c.
Note that we could also interpret the spatial implication operator in this model
as JP −∗ QKpi w = JP Kpi w −∗ JQKpi w. But we don’t need a semantics for spatial
implication as our tool does not support it yet.
Lemma 5 The interpretation of assertions given in Figure 11 is well defined, ie. all
denotations are non-expansive maps of type W → UPred(H).
Proof Straightforward, the most complicated case is for nested triples but fol-
lows then easily from Lemma 4 using the fact that J{P}e(t1, . . . , tn){Q}Kpi w k=J{P}e(t1, . . . , tn){Q}Kpi w′ if, and only if, for all n < k, for all η, σ and for γ′ as de-
fined in the Figure it holds that w, η, σ |=γ′n (JP Kpi , call N (t), JQKpi) ⇔ w′, η, σ |=γ′n
(JP Kpi , call N (t), JQKpi).
5.2.4 The environment for predicate definitions
For interpreting predicate tests like P(ev; es) we use a predicate environment that
maps each predicate identifier P to a specific semantic predicate of type Zarityi(P)×
Setaritys(P) → Pred and assume that predicates are always used with the right arity,
otherwise the predicate test is equivalent to false (of course, our tool uses a syntax
checker that would reject assertions that use a wrong number of arguments).
As in [40,7], recursively defined predicates are interpreted via Banach’s fixed
point theorem:
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JtrueKpi = >JfalseKpi w = ∅JP ∨QKpi w = JP Kpi w ∪ JQKpi wJP ∧QKpi w = JP Kpi w ∩ JQKpi w
(n, η, σ, h) ∈ J∃x. P Kpi w iff ∃v ∈ Z. (n, η[x 7→ v], σ, h) ∈ JP Kpi w
(n, η, σ, h) ∈ J∀x. P Kpi w iff ∀v ∈ Z. (n, η[x 7→ v], σ, h) ∈ JP Kpi w
(n, η, σ, h) ∈ J∀α. P Kpi w iff ∀v ∈ Set. (n, η, σ[α 7→ v], h) ∈ JP Kpi w
(n, η, σ, h) ∈ JP ⇒ QKpi w iff ∀m ≤ n.
(m, η, σ, h) ∈ JP Kpi w implies (m, η, σ, h) ∈ JQKpi w
( , η, , h) ∈ qe1V = e2V ypi w iff qe1V yη = qe2V yη and h = e
( , η, , h) ∈ qe1V 6= e2V ypi w iff qe1V yη 6= qe2V yη and h = e
( , η, σ, h) ∈ qe1S = e2Sypi w iff qe1Syη,σ = qe2Syη,σ and h = e
( , η, σ, h) ∈ JeE ∈ eSKpi w iff JeEKη ∈ JeSKη,σ and h = e
( , η, σ, h) ∈ JeE /∈ eSKpi w iff JeEKη /∈ JeSKη,σ and h = e
( , η, σ, h) ∈ qe1S ⊆ e2Sypi w iff qe1Syη,σ ⊆ qe2Syη,σ and h = e
( , η, , h) ∈ Je1 = e2Kpi w iff Je1Kη = Je2Kη and h = e
(n, η, σ, h) ∈ JP(eVη ; eS)Kpi w iff arityi(P) = |eV| and aritys(P) = |eS|
and (n, η, σ, h) ∈ pi(P)(JeVKη , JeSKη,σ)JempKpi w = empwJP ? QKpi w = JP Kpi w ? JQKpi w
( , η, , h) ∈ qeA 7→ e1V , . . . , enV ypi w iff ∀i ∈ {0..n−1}. JeAKη + i ∈ dom(h) and
∀i ∈ {0..n−1}. h(JeAKη + i) = qeiV yη
(n, η, σ, ) ∈ J{P}k(t1, . . . , tn){Q}Kpi w iff JkKη = dproc(z1, . . . , zn){localsy;C}e and
w, η, σ |=γ′n (JP Kpi , call N (t), JQKpi) where
γ′ = γ[N 7→ (proc(z1, . . . , zn){localsy;C})]
and N /∈ dom(γ)JP ⊗QKpi w = (JP Kpi ⊗ ι(JQKpi))w
Fig. 11 Interpretation of assertions.
Lemma 6 Let I be a set and suppose that, for each i ∈ I, Fi : PredI → Pred is
a contractive function. Then there exists a unique p = (pi)i∈I ∈ PredI such that
Fi(p) = pi, for all i ∈ I.
Since we use predicates with (integer and set) arguments, I needs to be chosen
accordingly.
I =
∑
P∈PredName
Zarityi(P) × Setaritys(P)
Since predicates cannot use global variables we thus get an interpretation for
recursively defined predicates. The existence of recursively defined predicates is
only guaranteed if their semantics is contractive which is in turn guaranteed if
the right hand side of their declaration is an instance of the pattern discussed at
length in [16].
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Definition 2 (Soundness of Predicate Context) If Π is a list of (syntactic)
predicate declarations then define its semantic validity w.r.t. a concrete predicate
environment pi as follows:
pi |= Π iff (recdef P(x;α) := Q) ∈ Π implies pi(P) ∈ Z|x| × Set|α| → UPred(H)
and for all v ∈ Z|x|, s ∈ Set|α|
∀n, η, σ, h. (n, η, σ, h) ∈ pi(P)(v, s)⇔ (n, η[x 7→ v], σ[α 7→ s], h) ∈ JQKpi
and if additionally (recdef P(x;α) := Q) ∈
LsegDefs(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
then for any R such that
∀n, η, σ, h. (n, η, σ, h) ∈ R(v, s)⇔ (n, η[x 7→ v], σ[α 7→ s], h) ∈ JQKpi
we have that pi(P) ⊆ R
and
(recdef P(x;α) := R(y;β) ◦ Ψ) ∈ Π implies
pi(P) ∈ Z|x| × Set|α| → UPred(H)
and for all v ∈ Z|x|, s ∈ Set|α| and n, η, σ, h
(n, η, σ, h) ∈ pi(P)(v, s)⇔ (n, η[x 7→ v], σ[α 7→ s], h) ∈
r
SˆΨP
z
pi
where SˆΨP is as defined in Lemma 8 below.
and
(∀P(x;α)) ∈ Π implies pi(P) ∈ Z|x| × Set|α| → UPred(H)
This definition ensures that pi satisfies the right conditions for predicate declara-
tions, declarations with invariant extension, abstract declarations, and inductive
declarations, respectively.
5.3 Semantics of judgements
First we define the semantics of assertions:
Definition 3 If Π is a predicate declaration and A an assertion then A is valid
in Π iff ∀pi |= Π. JAKpi = >. This validity judgement is abbreviated Π |= A. We
sometimes drop Π to write simply |= A if the predicate context is irrelevant.
Like the semantic judgement pi |= Π for predicate declaration, we also need
one for procedure declarations.
Definition 4 If Γ is a list of (syntactic) procedure declarations with pre- and
postconditions, then define the semantic validity for procedure environments as
follows:
γ |=npi Γ iff (proc F(z) ∀x,α. pre : P post : Q {localsy;C}) ∈ Γ implies
γ(F) = proc (z){localsy;C} and n |=γpi {P}callF(z){Q} and
(proc abstract F(z) ∀x,α. pre : P post : Q) ∈ Γ implies
n |=γpi (P, callF(z), Q).
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We write more succinctly γ |=pi Γ if ∀n ∈ N. γ |=npi Γ . The semantic version of
judgement Π;Γ  {P}C {Q} is defined as follows:
Π;Γ |= {P}C {Q} iff
∀n ∈ N.∀pi |= Π. ∀γ |=npi Γ. n |=γpi (P,C,Q).
Assume now the module (procedure declarations) (Fi)1≤i≤n under consideration
are summarised in a procedure declaration environment ΓF . Then the semantics
of judgement Π;ΓA `` {P}F(z) {Q} is defined as
Π;ΓA |= {P}F(z) {Q} iff
∀pi |= Π. ∀γ |=pi ΓA. |=γ∪ρpi (P, call F(z), Q).
where ρ |= ΓF .
5.4 Soundness of Assertion Logic
Our Hoare logic uses axioms for deriving assertions via entailment. Some of the
more interesting ones have been collected in Figure A.2. We have to establish their
soundness.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of `` for entailment of assertions) The rules for `` given
in Section 4.2 are all sound w.r.t. semantics given in Definition 4, in other words
Π  P ⇒ Q implies ∀pi |= Π. JP ⇒ QKpi = >
Proof Since most of the usual logical reasoning is outsourced to the SMT solver
which is assumed to be sound, we only have to deal with the more peculiar en-
tailment axioms. The ones from Separation Logic are sound due to Lemma 1.
The distribution laws for ⊗ are sound by the semantic definitions as given in Sec-
tion 5.2.1. Rule (RUnique) holds in our model only assuming that the semantics
of assertion R is contractive in predicate variable X as we then know that R gives
rise to a fixpoint that is necessarily unique in ultrametric spaces. Rules (Split)
and (Join) can be shown correct by induction (on the semantics) which itself
holds since the semantics of predicates declared as LSegDefs admit induction. The
(semantic) rule that we use for this is:
ListInduction
recdef L(s, t;α) := Q ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Π, (L(s, t;α)⇔ Q) |= s = t ? α = ∅ ⇒ P
Π, (L(s, t;α)⇔ Q) |=
(
P [s, α\n, β] ? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n ?
A1 ? · · · ? AN ? α = {(E1, . . . , Ek)} ∪ β
)
⇒ P
Π, (L(s, t;α)⇔ Q) |= L(s, t;α)⇒ P
where n,v, β /∈ fv(P ). Note that spatial implication is required to express the
conclusions of those axioms as instances of the above induction scheme but we
already know that this is available in Pred . For instance, for (Join) the predicate
P needs to be instantiated as ∀e2, eβ .L(t, e2; eβ) −∗ L(s, e2;α ∪ eβ). We could also
axiomatise spatial implication in the assertion logic which would allows us to derive
(Split) and (Join) from (ListInduction) but since our verifier does not support
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spatial implication there is actually no need for this.
The special interpretation of pure assertions guarantees axiom (?-SplitPureLeft).
To see this assume (n, η, σ, h) ∈ JA ? ΦKpi. Then h has the form h1 · h2 where
(n, η, σ, h1) ∈ JAKpi and (n, η, σ, h2)∈ JΦKpi. As Φ is pure h2 = e and so h = h1 such
that we get the desired result.
The axiom (?-SplitPureRight) also holds due to the special interpretation of pure
assertions. To see this assume (n, η, σ, h) ∈ JA ∧ (Φ ? true)Kpi. Then (n, η, σ, h) ∈JAKpi and (n, η, σ, h) ∈ JΦ ? trueKpi. Thus h has the form h1 · h2 where (n, η, σ, h1) ∈JΦKpi and (n, η, σ, h2) ∈ JtrueKpi. Since Φ is pure we have h1 = e and so h = h · h1,
and from this (n, η, σ, h) ∈ JA ? ΦKpi follows.
(ShallowFrameProcedures) and (ShallowFrame) hold as framing is “baked
into” the definition of the semantics of triples.
5.5 Soundness of Hoare Rules
Theorem 2 (Soundness of `` for triples) The rules for `` given in Section 4.1 are
all sound w.r.t. semantics given in Definition 4.
Proof Largely by adapting the proofs in [40,7], adding the procedure and predicate
environments appropriately. We discuss the new or substantially changed rules:
Rule (RecursiveProcedures) : For a given pi |= Π and γ |=pi ΓA and a proce-
dure declaration environment ρ |=pi ΓF that contains all n non-abstract declared
procedures Fi we show for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n simultaneously that
|=γ∪ρpi (pre(Fi), call Fi(params(Fi)), post(Fi))
which is equivalent to showing that
k |=γ∪ρpi (pre(Fi), call Fi(params(Fi)), post(Fi))
for all k or equivalently for all η, σ, w, k:
w, η, σ |=γ∪ρk (Jpre(Fi)Kpi, call Fi(params(Fi)), Jpost(Fi)Kpi) (5)
This is shown by induction on k. By definition of the operational semantics for
k = 0 the claim holds automatically as (more than) one step is used for interpreting
the call statement so it cannot reduce to skip in zero steps. Assume we have proved
the claim (5) for all number less than k and show it for k: According to Definition 1
of triple semantics, assume m < k, h ∈ Heap, and r ∈ UPred and let (m, η, σ, h) ∈Jpre(Fi)Kpi w ? i−1(w)(emp) ? r. Then it must be that h = h1 · h2 · h3, where
(a) (m, η, σ, h1) ∈ Jpre(Fi)Kpi w
(b) (m, η, σ, h2) ∈ ι−1(w)(emp) and
(c) (m, η, σ, h3) ∈ r.
First we need to show that (call Fi(params(Fi)), s · η, h) ∈ Safeγ∪ρm for any stack s.
By definition of the operational semantics – as the unfolding of a procedure and
executing the additional ; return statement take three steps – it suffices to show
that
(body(Fi), s · η · η[locals(Fi) 7→ 0], h) ∈ Safeγ∪ρm−3
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which follows from the rule’s hypothesis as follows: First we know by assumption
that γ |=m−3pi ΓA; by induction hypothesis ρ |=m−3pi ΓF so γ ∪ρ |=m−3 ΓA, ΓF , thus
by the rule’s hypothesis m − 3 |=γ∪ρpi (pre(Fi), body(Fi), post(Fi)). Now from this,
(a-c), and the fact that locals(Fi) do not appear in pre(Fi) the required follows.
Secondly, we need to show for all k ≤ m,h′ ∈ Heap, η′ ∈ Env, if
(call Fi(params(Fi)), s · η, h);γk (skip, s · η′, h′) (6)
where η′ = η since procedures in our language only have side effects on the heap,
then (m − k, η′, σ, h′) ∈ Jpost(Fi)Kpi w ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r. By (6) and definition of
operational semantics we know that
(body(Fi), s · η · η[locals(Fi) 7→ 0], h);γk−3 (skip, s · η · η′′, h′′) (7)
must hold for some h′′ ∈ Heap and η′′ ∈ Env. By the same argument as for the
first condition we obtain
k − 3 |=γ∪ρpi (pre(Fi), body(Fi), post(Fi)) (8)
As before, from (8), using (a-c) and the fact that pre(Fi) does not contain any of
the local variables of Fi we obtain that (m − (k − 3), η′′, σ, h′′) ∈ Jpost(Fi)Kpi w ?
ι−1(w)(emp) ? r and by downward closure that (m− k, η′′, σ, h′′) ∈ Jpost(Fi)Kpi w ?
ι−1(w)(emp) ? r. But by the definition of the operational semantics we know that
h′′ = h′, we already know η′ = η, and that η′′ = η[locals(Fi) 7→ . . .] since we do
not allow assignments to formal parameters. Since post(Fi) does not contain any
of the local variables of Fi from this follows that (m− k, η′, σ, h′) ∈ Jpost(Fi)Kpi w ?
ι−1(w)(emp) ? r.
Rule (Call) : Assume that pi |= Π and for all n, η, σ, h that
∀m ≤ n. (m, η, σ, h) ∈ J∀x. {A} k(p) {B})K)pi ⇒ (m, η, σ, h) ∈ J{P} k(e) {Q}Kpi (9)
Further assume an n and γ such that γ |=npi Σ, {A}F(p) {B}. From this we know
by definition that
n |=γpi (A, callF(p), B) (10)
We need to show that n |=γpi (P, callF(e), Q). Assuming arbitrary w, η, σ it suffices
to prove that w, η, σ |=γn (JP Kpi , callF(e), JQKpi). From (9) with m := n, η′ = η[k 7→
dγ(F)e] and γ′ := γ[N 7→ γ(F)] we obtain
(∀v. w, η′[x 7→v], σ |=γ′n (JAKpi, callN (p), JBKpi))⇒ w, η′, σ |=γ′n (JP Kpi, callN (e), JQKpi)
(11)
By definition of γ′ and η′, freshness of k and N , setting v := η(x) (11) entails
w, η, σ |=γn (JAKpi , callF(p), JBKpi)⇒ w, η, σ |=γn (JP Kpi , callF(e), JQKpi)
which by (10) and definition of n |=γpi (P, callF(e), Q) completes the proof.
Rule (StoreProc) : Assume pi |= Π and γ |=npi {A}F(p) {B}. From this we get:
n |=γpi (A, call F(p), B) (12)
We need to show that n |=γpi (e 7→ , [e] := F(t), e 7→ S(·)) where
S(·) = (∀p|U ,x. {A} · (p|U ) {B}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
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where |t| = |p|, ti either value expression ai or ; x = fv(A,B) − p and p =
(pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X . According to Definition 1 of |=,
assume m < n and r ∈ UPred and let (m, η, σ, h) ∈ Je 7→ Kpi w ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r.
Then it must be that h = h1 · h2 · h3, where
(a) (m, η, σ, h1) ∈ Je 7→ Kpi w
(b) (m, η, σ, h2) ∈ ι−1(w)(emp) and
(c) (m, η, σ, h3) ∈ r.
It is easy to show now that ([e] := F(t), s · η, h) ∈ Safeγ1 (so m = 1) becauseJeKη ∈ dom(h) due to (a), F ∈ dom(γ) by assumption and papply γ(F)(u) is de-
fined where ui = if ti = and ui = η(xi) if ti = xi. It remains to show that
(m − 1, η, σ, h1[JeKη 7→ dpapply γ(F) (u1, . . . , un)e]) ∈ Je 7→ S(·)Kpi w. By definition
of assertion semantics it suffices to show for all v,v′ that
w, η[x 7→ v,p|U 7→ v′], σ |=γ
′
m−1 (A[p|I\U\t|I\U ], callN (p|U ), B[p|I\U\t|I\U ])
where γ′ = γ[N 7→ (papply γ(F) (u1, . . . , un))]. Since η(t|I\U ) = u (the arguments
of papply) and by definition of γ′ this follows from
w, η[x 7→ v,p|U 7→ v′,p|I\U 7→ t|I\U ], σ |=γ
′
m−1 (A, callF(p), B)
which is obtained from (12) by instantiation and downward closure (as m − 1 <
m < n).
Rule (Eval) : We must show that assuming
Π;Γ |= P ⇒ e 7→ {P} · (e){Q} ? true (13)
it holds that Π;Γ |= {P}eval [e](e){Q}. So let pi |= Π, γ |=pi Γ , and let further η
be an integer variable environment, σ be a set variable environment and w ∈ W
and n ∈ N. We must show that
w, η, σ |=γn (JP Kpi , eval [e](e), JQKpi) (14)
According to Definition 1, assume m < n, h ∈ Heap, r ∈ UPred and let (m, η, σ, h) ∈JP Kpi w ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r. Then it must be that h = h1 · h2 · h3, where
(a) (m, η, σ, h1) ∈ JP Kpi w
(b) (m, η, σ, h2) ∈ ι−1(w)(emp) and
(c) (m, η, σ, h3) ∈ r.
From (a), (13) and the semantics of implication we obtain
(m, η, σ, h1) ∈ Je 7→ {P} · (e){Q} ? trueKpi w (15)
and thus there are heaps [l 7→ v] with JeKη = l and hr such that h1 = [l 7→ v] · hr
and (m, η, σ, [l 7→ v]) ∈ Je 7→ {P} · (e){Q}]Kpi w from which follows that
v ≡ dproc(z){locals y;C}e and w, η, σ |=γ′m (JP Kpi , call N (e), JQKpi) (16)
where γ′ = γ[N 7→ proc(z){locals y;C}] for a fresh procedure name N .
We observe by definition of the semantics, the fact that h = [l 7→ v] ·hr ·h2 ·h3 and
γ′(N ) = dve−1 (due to the first part of (16)), that for all stacks s and all k ∈ N
(eval [e](e), s · η, h);γk ∆ ⇐⇒ (call N (e), s · η, h);γ′k ∆ (17)
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First, we have to show for any stack s that (eval [e](e), s · η, h) ∈ Safeγm. But (17)
tells us that this is the case iff (call N (e), s · η, h) ∈ Safeγ′m which, in turn, follows
from the second part of (16) and the fact that (m, η, σ, h) ∈ JP Kpi w?ι−1(w)(emp)?r
by (a-c).
Next we show the second condition. Thus, assume k ≤ m and
(eval [e](e), s · η, h);γk (skip, s · η′, h′) (18)
We need to show that (m− k, η′, σ, h′) ∈ JQKpi w ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r. Again, by (17)
we know that (call N (e), s · η, h) ;γk (skip, s · η′, h′) from which by (16) it follows
that (m− k, η′, σ, h′) ∈ JQKpi w ? ι−1(w)(emp) ? r which completes the proof.
Other interesting rules: rule (RUnique) is not sound in general. However it
does hold if the predicates in pi are unique solutions of their defining equations
in Π. This can be guaranteed together with the existence of an pi ∈ Π if the
recursive predicate declarations are of a pattern described in detail in [16]. The
ghost statements are all interpreted like skip; they do not have a computational
effect and the soundness of the corresponding rules can thus be shown relatively
straightforwardly using the consequence rule.
5.5.1 Soundness of the SMT solver
The following theorem states that the judgement proven by the SMT solver is
sound for our logic (assuming that the solver is already sound for classical logic).
We already have a function that can eliminate spatial parts from assertions, we
also assume we have an operation ̂ that replaces ? by ∧ such that ̂purify(P ) is a
classical statement about numbers, tuples and sets.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of SMT) Assume the SMT solver correctly solves en-
tailments of translated pure assertions and that Φ and Θ are pure assertions. Then
Φ `SMT Θ implies JΦ⇒ ΘKpi = > for all predicate environments pi.
Proof By the assumption and the correctness of the SMT solver we obtain `cl Φ̂⇒
Θ̂ (†). We prove two lemmas:
1. For all pure assertions Υ , and all w ∈ W,n ∈ N, h ∈ Heap, η ∈ Env, σ ∈ SetEnv
it holds that (n, η, σ, h) ∈ JΥ Kpi w implies h = e and `cl Υ̂
2. For all pure assertions Υ , if `cl Υ̂ then (n, η, σ, e) ∈ JΥ Kpi w for all w ∈ W,n ∈
N, η ∈ Env, σ ∈ SetEnv.
With the two lemmas we can now show the theorem. Assume we have (m, η, σ, h) ∈JΦKpi w. Then by (1) we get that h = e and `cl Φ̂, from which by (†) it follows that
`cl Θ̂ and finally by (2) that (m, η, σ, e) ∈ JΘKpi w concluding the proof.
Lemmas (1) and (2) can be shown by induction on the structure of assertion
(disjunct) Φ and holds by definition of the semantics where it can be seen that
assertions that should be independent of the heap only hold in the empty heap e.
Note that a pure formula Υ in our logic does not hold in the common sense (where
its interpretation would need to hold for all heaps), but just for the empty heap.
This is why we do not have true as a pure assertion and thus do not have true in
the low level assertion logic. This is not a problem as we are interested in proving
validity of Hoare triples and not assertions and since pure assertions will always
be “framed onto” spatial assertions.
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6 Automation of program verification
In this section we explain how the automated verification works by giving deter-
ministic rules for proof search and discuss their soundness.
6.1 Overview
The automatic prover consists of three main parts.
1. Verification condition generator: The verification condition (VC) gener-
ator reads in annotated programs and produces from them a set of VCs, such that
if all the VCs hold then the input program meets its specifications. Each VC is of
the form Π;Γ `` {P}C {Q} as explained earlier.
2. Symbolic execution engine: We prove Hoare triples using symbolic execu-
tion with separation logic, based on ideas put forward in [5] and now well estab-
lished. The symbolic execution algorithm relies on automatic entailment provers
at various points. At the end of each symbolic execution step happens a cleanup
operation that is of a “cosmetic nature”, ie. its purpose is to keep the goals as
small as possible without changing their semantics.
3. Entailment provers: The use of nested triples adds considerably to the diffi-
culty of proving entailments automatically. Because assertions can contain triples
and vice versa, we need solvers for entailments between assertions and triples,
respectively, defined mutually recursively.
In fact in our implementation there are proof systems for five different judge-
ments; many of these proof systems need to invoke each other. The judgements
and their informal meanings are as follows. Shaded variables (such as the frame Θ)
are those whose value is not given as an input to the prover, but rather is inferred
by the proof rules.
– Φ ` I ∃v.Υ ? Θ . Entailment between assertion disjuncts. Spatial conjunction
Φ entails assertion disjunct ∃v.Υ with frame Θ left over. I is a mapping from
the existentially quantified variables v to appropriate witnesses for these.
– B1 ` B2. Entailment between behavioural specifications.
– B `find-post {Φ} · (t)
{
Q
}
. Computing the postcondition for an invocation.
This judgement computes an assertion Q which describes the state that results
from invoking code with behaviour B in a state described by spatial conjunction
Φ.
– Π : Υ `find-tr ∃ v . eA 7→ B ? Rpure .10 Finding specifications for code stored
on the heap inside a symbolic state. Rpure includes all the pure formulae that
are the result of any unfolding or splitting required during the search and that
are relevant for B(·) and x are the existentially quantified variables obtained
from unfolding or splitting.
– Π,Γ . {P}C {Q}. Symbolic execution.
We shall show that our proof systems for these judgements are all sound. The
following theorem shows soundness of the (implemented) symbolic execution, en-
10 In [14] we had a less refined version ignoring pure facts Rpure about variables x obtained
from unfolding which are important for certain examples, see Figure 12.
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tailment and other proof search rules with respect to the “core” logic introduced
in Section 5.5 which we already know are sound (see Theorem 2).
Theorem 4 Grand soundness theorem. Our five proof systems are sound, that is:
1. If Φ `I ∃v.Υ ? Θ (where fv(Φ) ∩ v = ∅) then |= Φ ⇒ Υ [v\I(v)] ? Θ where:
fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ), dom(I) = v and fv(Im(I)) ⊆ fv(Φ).
2. If B1 ` B2 then |= B1[ \k]⇒ B2[ \k] where k /∈ fv(B1, B2).
3. If B `find-post {Φ} · (t) {Q} then |= B[ \k]⇒ {Φ} k(t) {Q} where k /∈ fv(B,Φ,Q).
4. If Π : Υ `find-tr ∃v. eA 7→ B ? Rpure then Π |= Υ ⇒ ∃v. eA 7→ B ? Rpure ? Υ ′
for some Υ ′.11
5. If Π,Γ . {P}C {Q} then Π;Γ |= {P}C {Q} (that is, our symbolic execution rules
are sound).
We will also need the soundness of the SMT solver as shown in Theorem 3.
Proof (Grand Soundness Theorem) We have already shown in Section 5.5 the
soundness of the Hoare logic rules for the rule for judgements Π;Γ |= {P}C {Q}
and Π `` A. So in the soundness proofs we can freely use these “core” rules as listed
in Appendix A. In other appendices we present detailed soundness arguments for
selected interesting rules of each of the five judgements:
1. Φ `I Θ: See Appendix D where soundness of rules (InstUsingEq), (Can-
celPt1), and (InstMatchAddr) is shown.
2. B1 ` B2: See Appendix E where soundness of rules (RemoveRight), (DisjPre),
(ExistsPre), and (TripleEnt) is shown.
3. B `find-post {Φ} · (t) {Q}: See Appendix F where soundness of rules (Inst-
Param), and (InferSpecForCall) is shown.
4. Π |= Υ ⇒ ∃v. eA 7→ B ? Rpure ? Υ ′: See Appendix H where soundness of rules
(Find), (FindUnfold) and (FindSplit) is shown.
5. Π,Γ . {P}C {Q}: See Appendix C where soundness of rules (Lookup), (Eval)
and (StoreCode) is shown.
6.2 Verification Condition generation
First the predicate context Π is built. This is done by collecting all predicate dec-
larations provided by the user, and then adding some extra equivalences to allow
the convenient folding and unfolding of predicates defined by invariant extension.
More precisely, for each definition recdef S(a,b) := P(a) ◦ Ψ where P is recursively
defined as recdef P(a) := R[P] for some appropriate assertion R we automatically
declare a predicate SˆΨP(a,b) such that Sˆ
Ψ
P(a,b)⇔ S(a,b). The details can be found
in the following Section 6.2.1 (see Lemma 8). Note also that we assume that all
existentially quantified variables in predicate definitions are renamed to be fresh
in a way such that they can never clash with any other variables names in the
future. This removes some side conditions from rules involving predicates and also
allows the computation of the automatically declared predicates discussed above.
11 We deviate from [14] here in the sense that we only require⇒ and not⇔. This is necessary
to obtain a sound splitting rule for list segments not discussed in [14]. As a further advantage
it allows one to use a “core” (Eval) rule more akin to the one used in proof search.
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Secondly the procedure context Γ is built by collecting the specifications (pre-
and postconditions) declared for each procedure (including abstract ones); for each
procedure F we include in Γ the triple {pre(F)}F(params(F)) {post(F)}.
Finally for each (non-abstract) procedure F we generate the following VC:
Π,Γ . {pre(F)} body(F) {post(F)}
which will be proved with the help of symbolic execution rules as described in
Subsection 6.3
6.2.1 Invariant extension involving recursive predicates
Lemma 7 For every recursively defined predicate recdef P(x;α) := R[P] and Ψ with
free integer variables in y ∪ x, free set variables in β ∪ α none of which are existen-
tially quantified in R, there is a recursive predicate definition recdef SΨP(x,y;α,β) :=
Q(R)[SΨP ] such that S
Ψ
P(x,y;α,β)⇔ P(x;α)⊗Ψ .
Proof Plotkin’s Lemma states that h(fix f) = fix g if g ◦ h = h ◦ f for h : A → B
and endomaps f : A → A and g : B → B. This can be easily shown by using
the fixpoint property, fix f = f(fix f), using the rule (RUnique). We will use this
lemma, setting h(P ) := P ⊗Ψ , f(P ) := R[P ] and g(P ) := Q(R)[P ] where we extend
⊗ to work on predicates with arguments of type PredI in the natural pointwise
fashion. It then only remains to show that
Q(R)[ ⊗Ψ ]⇔ R[ ]⊗Ψ (19)
to conclude that fix Q(R) ⇔ (fix R)⊗Ψ . Define Q(R) by induction on R accord-
ingly:
Q(R) = (e; s) if R = (e; s)
Q(R) = φ if R = φ and φ is an atomic pure formula
Q(R) = Q(R1) ? Q(R2) if R = R1 ? R2
Q(R) = Q(R1) ∨Q(R2) if R = R1 ∨R2
Q(R) = ∀x.Q(R1) if R = ∀x.R1
Q(R) = ∃x.Q(R1) if R = ∃x.R1
Q(R) = Q(R1)⇒ Q(R2) if R = R1 ⇒ R2
Q(R) = {Q(R1) ? Ψ} e(t) {Q(R2) ? Ψ} if R = {R1} e(t) {R2}
We need to show (19) which is relatively straightforward. We provide details for
some interesting cases.
R = (e; s) :
Q(R)[ ⊗Ψ ] = ( ⊗Ψ)(e; s)
⇔pointwise def. of ⊗ ( (e; s)⊗Ψ)
= R[ ]⊗Ψ
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R = φ : Q(R)[ ⊗Ψ ] = φ⇔ φ⊗Ψ = R[ ]⊗Ψ
R = R1 ? R2 :
Q(R)[ ⊗Ψ ] = (Q(R1) ? Q(R2))[ ⊗Ψ ]
= Q(R1)[ ⊗Ψ ] ? Q(R2)[ ⊗Ψ ]
⇔Ind.Hypothesis (R1[ ]⊗Ψ) ? (R2[ ]⊗Ψ)
⇔ (R1 ? R2)[ ]⊗Ψ
R = {R1} e(t) {R2} :
Q(R)[ ⊗Ψ ] = {Q(R1) ? Ψ} e(t) {Q(R2) ? Ψ} [ ⊗Ψ ]
= {Q(R1)[ ⊗Ψ ] ? Ψ} e(t) {Q(R2)[ ⊗Ψ ] ? Ψ}
⇔Ind.Hypothesis {R1[ ]⊗Ψ ? Ψ} e(t) {R2[ ]⊗Ψ ? Ψ}
⇔ {R1[ ] ◦ Ψ} e(t) {R2[ ] ◦ Ψ}
⇔ {R1[ ]} e(t) {R2[ ]}⊗Ψ
R = ∃x.R1 :
Q(R)[ ⊗Ψ ] = ∃x.Q(R1)[ ⊗Ψ ]
⇔Ind.Hypothesis ∃x.(R1[ ]⊗Ψ)
⇔ (∃x.R1[ ])⊗Ψ since x /∈ fv(Ψ)
Lemma 8 For every recursively defined predicate recdef P(x;α) := R[P] and Ψ with
free integer variables in y∪x and free set variables in β∪α none of which are existen-
tially quantified in R, there is a recursive predicate definition recdef SˆΨP(x,y;α,β) :=
Rˆ[SΨP ] such that Sˆ
Ψ
P(x,y;α,β)⇔ P(x;α) ◦ Ψ .
Proof By Lemma 7 we can define SˆΨP(x,y;α,β) := S
Ψ
P(x,y;α,β) ? Ψ .
6.3 Symbolic execution
The symbolic execution rules for our verifier are given in full in Appendix B. One
such rule is:
Lookup
purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = (e′A + o)
Π;Γ .
{
x = (e[x\x′]) ? P ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′]
}
C {Q}
Π;Γ .
{
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn
}
x := [eA]; C {Q}
x′ fresh
Most of these rules are similar in spirit, if not detail, to those found in [5]. In
particular, we always reason about a command followed by a “continuation” C.
This allows us to avoid introducing existential quantifiers; the previous values of
variables can be represented with fresh variables such as x′ in the rule above. It
also demonstrates how the SMT solver is used to infer some pure facts (often for
equational reasoning).
To show their soundness, we derive our symbolic execution rules from the core
rules described in the previous section. As an example, Appendix C.1 gives such
a derivation for (Lookup).
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The rules which are intrinsically new in our work are those for the state-
ments which make use of higher order store, namely eval [eA](p) and [eA] :=
F(optparams). Here we just show a simplified version of the rule eval. The full ver-
sion of this rule allows additional annotations to the statement, which help guide
the proof. That version, and all the other rules, can be found in the Appendix.
EvalUnguided
Π : Υ `find-tr ∃y. eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} [y\w] `find-post {Υ ? Rpure [y\w]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
Π;Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π;Γ . {Υ} eval [eA](t′); C
{
Q′
} v′i ,w fresh
The assertion Rpure appearing in this rule contains (pure) information resulting
from unfolding predicates or splitting lists during the search for an appropriate
triple for the procedure stored in E. The need for including it in the precondition of
the `find-post judgment becomes clear when considering programs like in Figure 12.
The first predicate definition represents a varying number of adjacent heap cells.
The second predicate is a linked list segment containing code which expects two
such $Cell arguments. The number of cells for each argument can vary for each
stored procedure in the list, but this typing information is contained within the
abstract list %fs.
recdef $Cells(ptr, n) :=
n = 1 ? ptr 7→ ∨ n = 2 ? ptr 7→ , ∨ n = 3 ? ptr 7→ , , ;
recdef $CodeList(a, z; %fs) := a = z ?%fs = ∅
∨ ∃n,%rest , t1, t2,%types.
a 7→ ∀y, z. {$Cells(y, t1) ? $Cells(z, t2)} · (y, z) {$Cells(y, t1) ? $Cells(z, t2)} , n
?%types = {(1, t1)} ∪ {(2, t2)}
? $CodeList(n, z; %rest) ?%fs = {(a,%types)} ∪%rest ;
proc main(x, y, f)
∀a, z,%fs,%types.
pre : $Cells(x, 1) ? $Cells(y, 2) ? $CodeList(a, z; %fs)
? (f,%types) ∈ %fs ?%types = {(1, 1)} ∪ {(2, 2)};
post : $Cells(x, 1) ? $Cells(y, 2) ? $CodeList(a, z; %fs);
{
eval[f ](x, y)
}
Fig. 12 Example demonstrating the need for Rpure in (Eval)
Procedure main takes three arguments: the first and second point respectively
to 1 and 2 adjacent heap cells; the third points to some code at address f that is
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contained in the list beginning at address a. The final constraint in the precon-
dition says that the code at f expects 1 cell and 2 cells in its first and second
argument respectively. The body simply runs the code with the two arguments,
which intuitively will succeed. We will now discuss why it is important to include
extra pure information. The triple for f that is found by `find-tr splitting the
$CodeList predicate is:
∀y, z. {$Cells(y, t′1) ? $Cells(z, t′2)} · (y, z){$Cells(y, t′1) ? $Cells(z, t′2)}
where skolemization freshens the originally existentially quantified t1, t2 variables
to fresh t′1, t′2.
Then, in order to show the `find-post hypothesis of (EvalUnguided) the rule
(InferSpecForCall) from Appendix 6.4.3 requires to show that the current sym-
bolic state (Υ ) entails the precondition (P ). Without including the extra pure part
Rpure , the entailment thus is
$Cells(x, 1) ? $Cells(y, 2) ? $CodeList(a, z; %fs) ?
(f,%types) ∈ %fs ?%types = {(1, 1)} ∪ {(2, 2)} `
$Cells(x, t′1) ?
$Cells(y, t′2)
which does not hold because we do not remember anything about the values of t′1
and t′2 that had been revealed by the splitting. However, if we add the extra pure
information that will have been exposed by the `find-tr judgment using splitting
the entailment is (for clearer presentation the non-crucial parts are omitted)
$Cells(x, 1) ? $Cells(y, 2) ? $CodeList(a, z; %fs) ?
(f,%types) ∈ %fs ?%types = {(1, 1)} ∪ {(2, 2)} ?
. . . ?%types = {(1, t′1)} ∪ {(2, t′2)}
` $Cells(x, t
′
1) ?
$Cells(y, t′2)
which will hold because we can get the necessary equalities t′1 = 1 and t′2 = 2
through the assumption {(1, t′1)}∪{(2, t′2) = %types = {(1, 1)}∪{(2, 2)}. Note that
it is legitimate to add Rpure temporarily to the current state Υ as we know by
the `find-tr-assumption that Υ ⇒ true ? Rpure and thus Υ ⇔ Υ ? Rpure (by axioms
(?-SplitPureRight) and (?-SplitPureLeft)).
Simplification after each symbolic execution state
We can symbolically execute a procedure by symbolically executing the individual
program statements. The top level procedure is main(). At the end of each pro-
gram statement during symbolic execution, however, there is an optional “cleanup”
phase designed to simplify the symbolic heap state. This is merely cosmetic with
a goal of keeping the proof graphs more readable. There are three simplifications
taking place:
1. Remove unused skolem variables
2. Remove redundant pure formula
3. Minimize 7→ for adjacent heap-cells
The first stage looks for an equality (between integers or sets) where at least
one of the left or right-hand side is a skolem variable (identifiable by its ending
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with a number). The skolem variable may then be substituted by the expression on
the other side of the equality in the rest of the assertion, and the equality dropped.
cleanup1 (Φ) = if (v = e,Θ) or (e = v,Θ) ∈ split(Φ)
and isSkolem(v)
then Θ[v\e]
else Θ
where split(Φ) returns a list of all ways of splitting out an atomic formula A from
an assertion Φ, and returning a pair (A,Θ) where Θ is all the other formulae.
The second stage uses the SMT solver to remove any pure formulae which
are implicit in the rest of the assertion. This is achieved by initially partitioning
the assertion into two parts, ie. partition(Φ) = (Φspatial , Φpure) where Φspatial is a
spatial formula not containing any pure parts and Φpure is a pure formula such
that Φ ≡ Φspatial ? Φpure . Then, iterating through each pure atomic formula A in
Φpure , we check whether A is implied by the new assertion being built, and drop
A or add it to the new assertion accordingly.
cleanup2 (Φ) = cleanup2Aux(partition(Φ))
cleanup2Aux(Φspatial , Φpure) = if Φpure is empty then Φspatial
else if Φpure matches syntactically A ? Θpure
and purify(closure(Φspatial )) `SMT A
then cleanup2Aux(Φspatial , Θpure)
else cleanup2Aux(Φspatial ? A,Θpure)
The third stage looks for multiple points-to formula which, together, address
adjacent heap cells. These formulae can then be condensed into a single points-to
occurrence.
cleanup3 (Φ) = if Φ⇔ a 7→ C1, . . . ,Cn ? Φ′
and Φ′ ⇔ a′ 7→ C ′ ? Θ
and purify(closure(Φ)) `SMT a+ n = a′
then a 7→ C1, . . . ,Cn,C ′ ? Θ
else Φ
The cleanup is optional, set by a configuration flag. Whilst ordinarily it is de-
sirable with no adverse effects, there is a cost in verification time (especially those
stages using the SMT solver). Additionally, in the case of large assertions a pure
formula may be removed that is syntactically identical to part of a future entail-
ment goal. It is possible that the SMT solver reaches its timeout and verification
will not succeed because the entailment is no longer trivial.
Soundness of Cleanup stages For all three stages, i.e. for k = 1, 2, 3, we can show
that cleanupk(Φ)⇔ Φ.
1. For cleanup1 this follows from the fact that
h ∈ JΦ[v\e]Kρ ⇔ h ∈ JΦKρ[v:=JeKρ
⇔ h ∈ JΦKρ ∧ ρ(v) = JeKρ
⇔ h ∈ JΦKρ ∧ emp ∈ Jv = eKρ
⇔ h ∈ JΦ ? v = eKρ
for any heap h and environment ρ from which one can conclude that |= Φ?v =
e⇔ Φ[v\e].
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2. To show the soundness of cleanup2 it suffices to consider the else case of the
conditional and more precisely show that if Φpure matches syntactically A ?
Θpure and purify(closure(Φspatial )) `SMT A then Φspatial ? Φpure ⇔ Φspatial ?
Θpure . From the second assumption it follows from soundness of SMT, Lemma 9
and (Closure) that Φspatial ⇔ Φspatial ?A. Thus by (?-Monotonicity) we get
that Φspatial ? Φpure ⇔ Φspatial ? A ? Φpure . By the first assumption and (?-
Associative) we get that Φspatial ? Φpure ⇔ Φspatial ? Θpure .
3. Soundness of cleanup3 follows from the following considerations: From the third
assumption of the conditional follows by the soundness of the SMT solver that
purify(closure(Φ)) ⇒ a + n = a′ so by Lemma 9 and (Closure) we get that
Φ⇔ Φ ? a+ n = a′. Together with the other two assumptions in the condition
we obtain that Φ ⇔ a 7→ C1, . . . ,Cn ? a + n 7→ C ′ ? Θ from which the desired
result follows by (7→-Group).
6.4 Entailment proof search algorithms
6.4.1 Entailments between assertion disjuncts
The proof rules for this judgement are given in Figure 13, and their soundness is
proved in Appendix D.
There are three stages in the proof search.
1. Preparation. First, blocks of consecutive heap cells, on both sides of `, are
broken up e.g. x 7→ a, 0 is replaced by x 7→ a ? x+1 7→ 0. Secondly, pure
information which is implicit in the spatial parts on the left is made explicit
using closure(−), e.g. if the spatial parts are x 7→ ? y 7→ 0 the pure constraints
x 6= 0, y 6= 0 and x 6= y are added. We need to do this because otherwise, once
we start cancelling off spatial formulae we will lose this information.
2. Cancelling spatial formulae. This is the main part of the proof. We successively
cancel spatial pieces from the left and right sides of `, sometimes instantiating
existentially quantified variables in the process. For example, the goal Υ ?
x 7→ 3 `I ∃u,v. Φ ? x 7→ u ? Θ is reduced to Υ `I′ ∃v. Φ[u\3] ? Θ by
cancellation, where I will be I ′[u := 3]. During this stage, calls to the prover
for entailments between specifications may be necessary. For instance, when
solving the goal Υ ?x 7→ ∀a {P} · () {Q} `I Φ?x 7→ ∀a{P ′} · (){Q′} ?Θ we can
cancel the heap cells at x only if ∀a {P} · () {Q} ` ∀a{P ′} · (){Q′}. which is,
semantically speaking, ∀a {P} k() {Q} ⇒ ∀a{P ′} k(){Q′} for a fresh variable
k. Sometimes different choices of instantiation for an existential variable lead
to the cancellation of different spatial parts, so in general backtracking may
be needed. The rules that give rise to backtracking are explicitly labelled as
such. They are tried in the order in which they are listed. This means that
applications of the rules which can backtrack are postponed as long as possible,
which should be more efficient; if backtracking rules are used early, then other
independent reduction steps may need to be repeated in many branches. Note
that the rules are meant to match entailment problems modulo the order of
the spatial conjuncts involved.
Backtracking. As identified above, the four rules in this phase which backtrack
are (InstMatchAddr), (InstMatchArg), (InstTripleVars) and (PureInst).
In particular:
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InstUsingEq
Φ `I ∃v . Υ [v\e] ? Θ
Φ `I[v:=e] ∃v, v . Υ ? v = e ? Θ
fv(e) ∩ v, v = ∅
CancelPt1
Φ `I ∃v . Υ ? Θ
Φ ? eA 7→ C `I ∃v . Υ ? e′ 7→ ? Θ
fv(e′) ∩ v = ∅,
purify(Φ) `SMT eA = e′
CancelPt2
Φ `I ∃v . Υ ? Θ
Φ ? eA 7→ E `I ∃v . Υ ? e′ 7→ E′ ? Θ
fv(e′, E′) ∩ v = ∅,
purify(Φ) `SMT eA = e′,
purify(Φ) `SMT E = E′
CancelPred
Φ `I ∃v . Υ ? Θ
Φ ? P (e1, . . . , ek) `I ∃v . Υ ? P (e′1, . . . , e′k) ? Θ
fv(e′1, . . . , e
′
k) ∩ v = ∅,
purify(Φ) `SMT (e1 = e′1 ∧ . . . ∧ ek = e′k)
CancelPtTriple
Φ `I ∃v . Υ ? Θ B1 ` B2
Φ ? eA 7→ B1 `I ∃v . Υ ? e′ 7→ B2 ? Θ
fv(e′, B2) ∩ v = ∅,
purify(Φ) `SMT eA = e′
CancelPtInstContents
Φ `I ∃v . Υ [v\E] ? Θ
Φ ? eA 7→ E `I[v:=E] ∃v, v . Υ ? e′ 7→ v ? Θ
fv(e′) ∩ v, v = ∅,
purify(Φ) `SMT eA = e′
InstMatchAddr
Φ ? eA 7→ C `I ∃v . (Υ ? x 7→ C ′)[x\e] ? Θ
Φ ? eA 7→ C `I[x:=eA] ∃v, x . Υ ? x 7→ C ′ ? Θ
backtracks
InstMatchArg
Φ ? P (e1, . . . , ek) `I ∃v . (Υ ? P (e′1, . . . , e′r−1, v, e′r+1, . . . , e′k))[v\er] ? Θ
Φ ? P (e1, . . . , ek) `I[v:=er ] ∃v, v . Υ ? P (e′1, . . . , e′r−1, v, e′r+1, . . . , e′k) ? Θ
fv(e′1, . . . , e
′
r−1) ∩ v = ∅,
backtracks
InstTripleVars
Φ `I ∃v . (Ψ ? eA 7→ B)[v\w] ? Θ
Φ `I[v:=w] ∃v, v . Ψ ? eA 7→ B ? Θ
w ∈ fv(Φ), v ∈ fv(B)
backtracks
PureInst
Φ `I ∃v . Υ pure [v\w] ? Φ
Φ `I[v:=w] ∃v,v . Υ pure ? Φ
w ∈ fv(Φ),
backtracks
Pure
purify(Φ) `SMT Υ pure
Φ `∅ Υ pure ? Φ
Identity
Φ `∅ Φ
Fig. 13 Rules for automatically proving entailments between assertion disjuncts.
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– (InstMatchAddr). Here we should commit to the first available choice of
cell from the RHS (that cell will have to be cancelled sometime, so there is
no point trying other choices), but then backtrack trying different cells on
the LHS.
– (InstMatchArg). Here we should commit to the first available choice of
predicate use on the RHS (this will have to be cancelled sometime, so
there is no point trying other choices), but then backtrack trying different
predicate uses on the LHS.
– (InstTripleVars). Here we instantiate variables which appear inside a
nested triple, but are actually quantified at the top level (outside the triple).
We arbitrarily choose variables which appear in the LHS.
– (PureInst). Here we unintelligently guess instantiations for any remaining
quantified variables that appear in a pure formula. It arbitrarily chooses a
variable from the LHS.
Cutting. For efficiency reasons, some of the above rules can sometimes cut when
they fail. Reminiscent of the cut operation ! in Prolog, this causes the search to
abandon the current goal and return to the last point at which a backtrackable
choice was made. Cutting is done when one of the rules can detect already that
the current goal is not proveable.
For example, given the goal P(x) `I P(x)?y 7→ , the (CancelPt1) rule (which
is tried before (CancelPred)) can already detect that the goal is unprovable
because there is no way to cancel y 7→ from the right. Thus (CancelPred)
cuts and this goal is abandoned, rather than wasting the time of using (Can-
celPred) to cancel P(x) from both sides only to get stuck later.
3. Pure reasoning. The cancellation rules are designed to reduce the goal to the
form Υ `I Φ ? Θ where Φ is pure. We finish by sending the pure entailment
problem purify(Υ ) `SMT Φ to an SMT solver (see rule (Pure)), and we take Υ
as the inferred frame Θ, and the empty map for I.
6.4.2 Entailments between specifications
The four proof rules for the judgement B1 ` B2 are given in Figure 14, and their
soundness is proved in Appendix E. The rules are applied in the order we present
them.
The first three rules simplify the entailment problem by making the specifi-
cation on right hand side simpler. The first rule, (Remove∀Right), removes the
(top-level) universal quantifiers, the second rule (DisjPre) deals with disjunctions
in the precondition and the third rule (ExistsPre) removes any existential quan-
tifiers in the precondition.
The final rule (TripleEnt) breaks down the checking of an entailment B `
{Φ}·(t) {Q} between specifications into two tasks. Intuitively, we first use `find-post
to try to compute a postcondition ∨mi=1∃vi.Υi for the code with specification B
when run in a state satisfying Φ. We then check whether ∨mi=1∃vi.Υi implies the
required postcondition Q, making sure no variable clashes can occur.
6.4.3 Inferring postconditions for invocations
The proof rules for this judgement are given in Figure 15, and their soundness is
proved in Appendix F. The first rule we have for `find-post instantiates ∀ quantifiers
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1 Remove∀Right
∀y.B ` B′[y ′\w ]
∀y.B ` ∀y ′.B′ w fresh
2 DisjPre
n∧
i=1
∀y.B ` {∃vi.Φi} · (t) {Q}
∀y.B ` {∃v1.Φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∃vn.Φn} · (t) {Q}
3 ExistsPre
∀y.B ` {Φ[v\a]} · (t) {Q}
∀y.B ` {∃v.Φ} · (t) {Q} a fresh
4 TripleEnt
B `find-post {Φ} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υi
}
m∧
i=1
Υi[vi\ai] `Ii ∃bji .(Υ ′ji [wji\bji ]) ? Θi
B ` {Φ} · (t)

m′∨
i=1
∃wi.Υ ′i

1. j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m′},
2. a1, . . . ,am all chosen fresh,
3. bj1 , . . . ,bjm′ all chosen fresh
4. Θ1, . . . , Θm pure
Fig. 14 Rules for automatically proving entailments between specifications.
InstParam
(∀a . {P} · (t1, y, t2) {Q}) [y\t] `find-post {Φ} · (t1, t, t2)
{
Q′
}
∀a, y . {P} · (t1, y, t2) {Q} `find-post {Φ} · (t1, t, t2)
{
Q′
} t1 ∩ (a ∪ {y}) = ∅
InferSpecForCall
Φ `I ∃uk,a.Υk ? Θ
∀a.
{
n∨
i=1
∃ui.Υi
}
· (t)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
}
`find-post {Φ} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
(∃vi.Υ ′i [a\I(a)] ? Θ)
}
1. t ∩ a = ∅,
2. fv(Φ) ∩ uk,a = ∅,
3. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have vi ∩ a = ∅
4. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, no formula in I(a) contains a variable from vi
5. k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
6. no formula in I(uk) contains a variable from a
7. uk ∩ a = ∅
backtracks
Fig. 15 Rules for automatically inferring postconditions for procedure invocations.
on the left hand side so that the parameters in the two specifications match.
(The side condition here makes sure that we instantiate the leftmost quantified
parameter, for the sake of determinism.)
The main rule for `find-post is (InferSpecForCall). Underlying the rule is a
combination of ∀-instantiation, and the (ShallowFrameProcedures) and (Con-
sequenceProcedures) axioms.
Note that after (InstParam) has been used to make the parameters match,
some bound variables may need to be renamed to fresh variables to allow the
(InferSpecForCall) rule to be used. We do not go into detail about these re-
namings.
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Find
P `SMT e′A = eA + o
Π : P ? eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, B,Co+1, . . .Cn `εfind-tr e′A 7→ B
FindUnfold
purify(closure(Ψi[vi\wi][v\E] ? P )) `SMT false for all i 6= k
Π,X(v)⇔ ∃v1.Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃vn.Ψn : Ψk[vk\wk][v\E] ? P `εfind-tr ∃a. eA 7→ B ? Rpure
Π,X(v)⇔ ∃v1.Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃vn.Ψn : X(E) ? P `εfind-tr
∃a,wk. eA 7→ B
? purify(Ψk[vk\wk][y\E]) ? Rpure
w1, . . . ,wn fresh
FindSplit
recdef L(s, t, α) := Q ∈ LsegDefn(s, n,v, [C1, . . . ,CK ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
P `I ∃u1, . . . , uk . (u1, . . . , uk) ∈ eˆγ ? Θ
S =

L(eˆ, s, α)
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CK , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, eˆ′, β)
? eˆγ = α ∪ {(I(u1), . . . , I(uk))} ∪ β
? E1 = I(u1) ? · · · ? Ek = I(uk)

Π,L(x)⇔ Q : S[s, n,v\w] ? P `εfind-tr eA 7→ B(·) ? Rpure
Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ Q : L(eˆ, eˆ′, eˆγ) ? P `εfind-tr eA 7→ B(·) ? purify(S[s, n,v\w]) ? Rpure
α, β,w fresh, u1, . . . , uk fresh
Fig. 16 Rules for finding specifications inside a symbolic state
6.4.4 Finding specifications inside a symbolic state
To be able to symbolically execute an eval [e](p) statement, we need to first find
in our symbolic heap a cell e 7→ B; we can then use the specification B to reason
about the invocation. We use `find-tr for finding such specifications. The proof
rules for this judgement are given in Figure 16.
When the required cell e 7→ B is explicitly present in the symbolic heap, finding
it is easy; the (Find) rule covers these cases. In practise, however, the specifica-
tion is often “packaged up” inside a user-defined predicate, and requiring such
predicates to be explicitly unfolded or split to reveal the specification would be
extremely inconvenient. Therefore, our prover for `find-tr does a limited amount
of such unfolding and splitting automatically, as described by the (FindUnfold)
and (FindSplit) rules. The exact limitation is determined by a constant that pre-
scribes the “depth” of the nested unfoldings which is kept small to reduce the
search space. An extension to address this issue will be presented in Section 6.6.
6.5 An example of proving entailments between specifications
We mentioned in Section 3 that a key step in the verification of our example pro-
gram is proving that the strong specification for the list library entails the weaker
variation (see the entailment (2)). We now discuss this point in more detail, em-
phasising how the entailment prover for assertions and the prover for specifications
are mutually recursive.
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Before the call to the useFib procedure in main, the $ListLibraryStrong pred-
icate is unfolded, and folded up into $ListLibraryWeak . This essentially means
proving (2) which is an entailment between assertion disjuncts.
The proof proceeds by cancelling out the atomic formulae, which in this case
means using (CancelPtTriple) for each of the four library procedures. This is
where the entailment prover for specifications is needed: the premise of this rule
requires that each strong specification entails the respective weak variation.
This entailment is checked by the (TripleEnt) rule, which has two premises.
The first uses the judgement `find-post – with (InferSpecForCall) – which will
check that the weak precondition entails the strong precondition, with some in-
ferred frame left over (in this case the frame is trivial). For the second premise
it is required to prove that the strong postcondition (together with the frame)
entails the weak one. Using again the entailment prover for assertion disjuncts,
one obtains the following:
$AssocListH (al , {key} ∪ κ) `[κ′ 7→{key}∪κ] ∃κ′. $AssocListH (al , κ′)
The detailed steps of the reasoning are reproduced in Appendix I.
6.6 Advanced hints
In Section 2.3.2, one saw hints for the prover in the form of instantiation hints, for
quantified variables, and ghost-statements, used during the symbolic execution.
For some specific example programs, a need arose for the provision of additional
hints. These advanced hints allow the user to gain explicit control over the au-
tomated built-in entailment proof search algorithms to perform complex logical
reasoning the automated algorithms are unable to perform on their own (due to
restricted power of the SMT solver and limited proof search). We distinguish two
categories:
– for eval: user-guidance for finding the right triple by using ghost unfolds and
splits and using a lemma to show the entailment between the stored procedure’s
precondition and current state.
– for storing procedures: relaxing the condition that the stored procedure must
meet the specification prescribed by the current state and allowing a user-
guided entailment proof between established and required triple in terms of
ghost folds in pre- and postcondition.
6.6.1 Predicate folding for finding triples and lemma application for entailment
atomicst ::= . . .
| eval [aexp](x∗) inst-hints? lookup? lemma-app?
| . . .
lookup ::= before ghostopen∗
lemma-app ::= after L(t∗)
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The eval statement has been enriched with two hooks into the execution of the
eval rule. The “lookup” hint that may be provided to eval [a](. . .) tells the prover
where to find the triple at address a in the cases where it is (deeply) hidden inside
predicate instances. It is a list of ghost unfold/split statements. As mentioned in
Section 6.4.4, without the hints if the triple is not explicitly visible in the symbolic
heap state our verifier will only do a limited amount of automatic unfolds/splits
which, however, are carried out in an unintelligent and inefficient way when there
are a large number of predicate instances in the current symbolic heap. Accord-
ingly, the `find-tr judgement presented earlier is extended to allow the provision
of a sequence of ghost statements G: Π : Υ `Gfind-tr e 7→ B ? Rpure . This gives the
user some control over the search for matching nested triples. The two extra rules
which make use of the G, (FindGuidedUnfold) and (FindGuidedSplit), can be
found in Appendix G.
The “lemma-app” hint provides a hook to apply a lemma to the current sym-
bolic state, before the stored procedure is evaluated. First we have to explain what
we mean by a lemma as there are no extra syntactic lemma declarations. We rather
follow VeriFast [30,29] and make use of the following observation:
{P} skip {Q} ⇐⇒ P ⇒ Q
Thus, an entailment lemma of the form P ⇒ Q can be declared simply as a
procedure with precondition P , postcondition Q and body skip. This is desirable
because the lemma will be automatically proved (with the additional help of ghost
statements maybe). If the lemma is an abstract procedure, then the obligation to
prove it falls to the user to undertake elsewhere. This feature is useful when the
SMT solver is unable to complete the proof.
6.6.2 Predicate folding for triple entailment
atomicst ::= . . . | [aexp] := F(optparam∗)
deepframe? storecode-pre? storecode-post?
storecode-pre ::= pre ghost-fold+
storecode-post ::= post ghost-fold+
The next class of hint concerns the statement for storing code. Consider the
example in Figure 17.
This example uses two predicates, $List representing a list of procedures, and
$A representing the pre/postcondition of the procedures which appear in the list.
To make the code-list definition easily reusable, the specification has been param-
eterized by the predicate $A. Thus, for different examples the same list definition
can be used by providing different definitions of the $A predicate.
In procedure F we have a pointer l to a list. The line [f ] := G( ) adds procedure
G to the head of the list, resulting in a new list starting at f . But G’s footprint is
smaller than $A, which is allowable because we can use the deepframe annotation
to frame on the additional constraint(s). During the symbolic execution of F , it is
then necessary to prove the entailment
f 7→ ∀r. {r 7→ ? c 7→ } · (r) {r 7→ ? c 7→ } ` f 7→ ∀x. {$A(x)} · (x) {$A(x)}
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const c;
recdef $A(a) := a 7→ ? c 7→ ;
recdef $List(a; %A) := a = 0 ?%A = ∅
∨ ∃n,%B. a 7→ ∀x. {$A(x)} · (x) {$A(x)} , n ? $List(n; %B) ?%A = %B ∪ {a};
proc F(l)
∀ %L.
pre : ∃hd. l 7→ hd ? $List(hd; %L);
post : ∃hd,%L2. l 7→ hd ? $List(hd; %L2) ?%L ⊆ %L2;
{
locals head , f ;
head := [l];
f := new 0, head;
[f ] := G( ) ‘ deepframe
c 7→ pre fold $A(?) post fold $A(?) ’
ghost ‘fold $List(f ; ?)’
[l] := f
}
proc G(r)
pre : r 7→ ;
post : r 7→ ;
{ skip }
Fig. 17 Example demonstrating additional hints for the store-code statement.
It is clear that the nested pre- and postcondition are precisely $A(r), however the
proof algorithm for entailment of triples does not do automatic folds or unfolds
(since they are expected to be done in ghost statements in the procedure body
only) and thus needs to be told that this is the case. The two extra pre and post
annotations to the store-code statement hint serve this purpose and can give the
necessary fold instruction. A demonstration of the use of such hints in a more
realistic setting can be seen in the verification of the reflective visitor pattern [28].
To establish the extra annotations the entailment judgement `I needs to be
able to use the predicate context, and take a fold command giving rise to the
following enriched form of judgement:
Π : Φ `IG ∃v.Υ ? Θ
The enriched judgement is supported by two extra entailment rules, which are
used by a new (StoreCodeGuided) rule for storing procedures. These rules are
given in Figure 18, and their soundness is proved in appendices C.5 and D. Note
that this rule can only be applied to cases where the triple being manipulated does
not contain a disjunction in its pre- or postcondition. This has been sufficient for
our examples, however the rule could be generalised by iterated uses of the `∅G in
the premise.
7 Related work
The verification algorithms presented and proved correct in this paper have been
implemented in a tool, Crowfoot, that can be considered as extending Smallfoot
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StoreCodeGuided
Π : ((Φ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′] `∅Gpre X(d) ? Φ′
Π : ((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′] ? emp a`∅
Gpost
Y (e) ? Θ′
S =
 ∀p|U ,x.
{ ∃v,a′. (X(d)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v] }
·(p|U ){ ∃w,a′. (Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w] }
 [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
purify(Υ ) `SMT E = E′ + o
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . {Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . { Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn }
[E] := F(t)
‘deepframe ∃a. Υ ′
pre Gpre
post Gpost ’; C
{
Q′
}
where |t| = |p| and ti either value expression ai or ;
x = fv(S-precondition, S-postcondition)− p; v′,w′,a′,v′′,w′′ fresh
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X
FoldPredRight
(X(v)⇔ (∃v1. Υ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn. Υn)) ∈ Π∧
1≤i≤n
(Υi[v\e][vi\di] ? Θ `∅ Φ ? emp)
Π : X(e) ? Θ `∅G Φ ? emp
d1 . . .dn fresh
G = fold X( )
FoldPredLeft
X(v)⇔ (∃v1,b1. Υ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn,bn. Υn) ∈ Π
Φ `I ∃w, c. Υi[v\q][b\y][vi\w] ? Θ
Π : Φ `∅G X(e) ? Θ
G = fold X(p) b = y,
bi ⊆ b, b− bi ∩ (fv(Υi) ∪ p) = ∅
1 ≤ i ≤ n, c,w fresh,
each pi is an expression or ?,
each qi is
{
ci if pi is ?
pi otherwise
,
each ei is
{
I(ci) if pi is ?
pi otherwise
Fig. 18 Additional symbolic execution and entailment rules for store-code hints
[5] (though Crowfoot was written from scratch) by allowing (partially applicable)
procedures to be stored on the heap and to be invoked from the heap. The assertion
language uses nested triples to specify stored procedures and recursively defined
assertions to deal with recursion through the store. An SMT solver is invoked to
deal with pure assertions and therefore Crowfoot can be used to prove more than
just memory safety (see [13,28], and the example in this paper where fib is proved
to compute Fibonacci numbers).
Nowadays, there exist numerous logics and verification systems that use sep-
aration logic and some of them are Coq extensions. In this section we will only
focus on the ones that support higher-order store. A detailed comparison of effec-
tiveness and user friendliness between automatic tactics in Coq-based verifiers (like
CFML, Ynot or Bedrock) and the (semi-)automation provided by dedicated tools
(like jStar, VeriFast and Crowfoot), respectively, is difficult and beyond the scope
of this article. It is subject to further research. One point is obvious though, all
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Coq extensions automatically have access to a second order assertion logic which
the stand-alone systems do not have or have only in a weak sense12.
7.1 Stand-alone systems following in the footsteps of Smallfoot
VeriFast The system most closely related to Crowfoot is the VeriFast [30,29] tool,
also based on symbolic execution with separation logic. VeriFast supports a C-
like language (and also Java) and supports C-style function pointers. Functions in
the C-like language live in an immutable memory and can be pointed to but not
updated, whereas Crowfoot’s programming language stores procedures in dynamic,
mutable memory. However these setups seem to have a similar character.
A key difference is that while Crowfoot uses nested triples to express require-
ments for procedure pointers, VeriFast expresses such requirements via function
types with which the C type system is extended. A function type declaration asso-
ciates a pre- and postcondition with the function type; the declared type can have
extra arguments to simulate nested triples which can contain free variables. These
can be recursive since for every function type F there is a predicate ‘is F ( )’ which
states that (the function pointed to by) its first argument satisfies the “contract”
for function type F (possibly with additional arguments).
The presented tool also offers some features which VeriFast does not, such as
partial application of which our example makes essential use in useFib when load-
ing the memoiser mem. Another important feature to support stored procedures
is entailment between Hoare triples which is automated in our verifier and needed
in our example, as explained in Section 6.5. VeriFast does not support such proofs
(which in that system would be proofs of entailments of shape is F ( )⇒ is G( )),
even manual ones, whereas Crowfoot finds them automatically. Crowfoot supports
annotations for deep frame rule application and allows extensions of (recursive)
predicates, thus allowing elegant use of deep framing on recursively defined spec-
ifications (cf. definition of $S in our example in Figure 4). In VeriFast one can
simulate the effect of the deep frame rule by using (second order) function types
which take as argument a predicate representing the deeply framed invariant.
However, this means one must write all specifications that can appear for stored
procedures a priori in that style.
On the other hand, VeriFast offers features that Crowfoot does not, such as
concurrency, termination checking and the use of more types (such as mathematical
lists and functions on them) in the assertions. VeriFast’s support for second order
logic is useful for specifying and reasoning about higher-order and polymorphic
functions.
7.2 Shallow embeddings in Coq
There exist a number of verification systems for higher-order store based on sepa-
ration logic that have been developed in Coq: XCAP [33] a logic for assembly code,
Bedrock [18] which provides significant automation for the XCAP logic, GCAP
12 In Crowfoot we can quantify over predicates but only on the outermost level ie. we cannot
substitute predicate variables.
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[10], an extension of XCAP for self-modifying code, CFML [12], a tool for veri-
fying ML functions including references using characteristic functions, Ynot [32]
implementing Hoare Type Theory as a Coq library with some efficient Coq tactics
added in [19].
XCAP/GCAP Both systems have been developed to prove correctness of assembly
programs. In contrast to the Crowfoot logic, which supports a high-level C-like lan-
guage, the CAP (certified assembly programs) approach is intensional. This means
that assembly code is syntactically saved as first-order data in the store, so that
it can be manipulated and (partially) overwritten. The Crowfoot language treats
code extensionally, and therefore code can only be stored or invoked. Since the
stored procedures can have arguments, their invocation allows a form of code
configuration through their actual parameters. Code manipulation is limited by
those features. This resembles the extended CAP approach, XCAP [33], that uses
embedded code pointers. Modularity is achieved by adding new syntax for propo-
sitions, cptr(f,a), expressing that precondition a holds for the code at label f. The
interpretation of this new assertion syntax is only ever done when the entire pro-
gram and its code labels are known. When proving correctness locally one only
uses implications between assertions, a kind of relative correctness. In Crowfoot,
modularity is ensured by using nested triples and procedures with arguments can
be stored on the heap as a high-level language is used.
The “general” CAP approach, GCAP, drops “the assumption that code mem-
ory is fixed and immutable” [10] to support code generation and manipulation.
The framework is platform independent using a General Target Machine that can
be instantiated easily by specifying the intended operational semantics. The inten-
sional descriptions of code blocks themselves have to be added to the assertions
in program specifications. This approach is again based on the intensional rep-
resentation of code and provides great flexibility. During verification, one has to
keep carrying around the code block descriptions used for updates. It is pointed
out that this “does not compromise modularity, since the code is already present”
[10]. Correspondingly, code specifications map code blocks to assertions.
By contrast, Crowfoot code is always described by Hoare triples, the intensional
representation is forgotten. The flexibility of updating code (and its specification)
is ensured by the feature of nested Hoare triples that can express what specification
a code pointer is supposed to satisfy in another procedure’s pre- or postcondition.
Both program logics have been proved sound. While inductive techniques tra-
ditionally used with operational semantics are employed for XCAP/GCAP, the
Crowfoot soundness proof makes use of a hybrid semantics where a standard op-
erational programming language semantics is in use but a rather sophisticated
interpretation of assertions using Kripke semantics combined with step-indexing.
Bedrock is a Coq framework that supports mostly-automated XCAP proofs. This
provides semi-automated proofs with hints and achieves something very similar to
what Crowfoot offers. In both systems automation makes use of simplification of
assertions, automatic unfolding of predicates where possible, and cancellation of
spatial conjuncts until only a pure fact remains. In Bedrock this is all implemented
with the help of Coq’s Ltac tactical language, a domain-specific language for proof-
search. Bedrock is platform-independent and supports the XCAP logic, ie. embed-
ded code pointers but not the more involved GCAP logics for self-modification.
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CFML supports the verification of (a subset of) Caml programs using the Coq
proof assistant. Caml programs are higher-order functional programs with general
references. Therefore CFML supports higher-order store. CFML works slightly
differently from other verifiers in the sense that it builds a characteristic formula for
the given Caml program that is then used in the proof. This approach follows ideas
as presented in [26]. The characteristic formula of a program term is a proposition
expressed in higher-order logic that describes the semantics of Hoare triple for this
term (where pre- and post-condition are given as parameters) without referring
to the program syntax itself. It describes the axiomatic semantics of the program
term in purely logical form. The characteristic formula of a given program applied
to the pre- and post-condition of a given specification can then be proved in Coq
using logical means provided that separation logic has been embedded shallowly
to describe heaps 13 and program values are reflected in the logic (which is non
trivial for functions). A set of Coq tactics have been developed and where hints
are necessary the proof has to be carried out interactively. This approach is only
limited by the expressiveness of the theorem prover used (here Coq) and a relative
completeness theorem has been shown which is one particular bonus of using
characteristic formulae.
Ynot [32] is an axiomatic extension to Coq’s type theory in which Hoare triples
(“Hoare types”) can be used as the types for side-effecting commands; these Hoare
types can be nested. Mixing Hoare triples with types permits the inclusion of Hoare
specifications in abstract data types and thus elegant modular specification of
imperative higher-order programs. Hoare Type Theory does not support recursion
through the store set up on the fly as discussed in [32][Section 9] but admits
predefined knots in the store with the help of recursive specifications. In Crowfoot
we do not have this restriction but we also do not have a built-in type theory.
Types in Crowfoot must be explicitly described as predicates. Improved tactics
for Hoare Type Theory in Coq based on Ltac have been implemented in [19].
8 Crowfoot Usability Report
An interactive version of Crowfoot can be used online [1], which includes the exam-
ple of this paper. Additionally, our earlier work describes several other applications
of the logic:
1. verification of runtime code updates [13]
2. verification of a program that evaluates expressions in a binary tree [16]
3. verification of an instance of the reflective visitor pattern [28]
4. verification of a higher-order list search algorithm (online example)
5. verification of an updatable login server (online example)
6. inspired by media players, verification of a program that allows user triggered
loading/unloading of plugins (online example)
We’ll now briefly discuss our practical experiences.
The Crowfoot tool was developed incrementally, adding new language and
verification features, and improving automation as warranted by the increasing
complexity of examples.
13 The Conjunction rule is not needed here, nor is it in Crowfoot.
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In terms of automation, the provision of hints are the main manual burden.
Because the verification is not interactive, a degree of prescience is required in
order to ensure required predicate fold/unfold instructions take place at the correct
point in the proof tree. This should be fairly intuitive for the same human verifier
who constructed the definitions of predicates. A difficulty arises however when
there is a choice for unfolding/folding a predicate, requiring predicate arguments
to be provided in the annotations. In the event that these variables have been
skolemized, it will not be easy to know the actual variable name until attempting
to verify the program.
A problem that is specific to the higher-order store class of programs, par-
ticularly recursive ones, is that an eval command may need to unfold predicates
in order to expose the specification of the code. Whilst the tool will automati-
cally start unfolding predicates if the contents of the address is not accessible, this
blind searching will slow verification time in cases where there are many predi-
cates instances. The alternative is to provide the “lookup” hints as discussed in
Section 6.6.1.
These drawbacks can be overcome to some extent by the graphical visual out-
put that Crowfoot produces. This output represents the proof tree and, if the
automatic proof failed, it is highlighted where in the tree the proof got stuck.
In most cases the problem is trivially identified – be it from a missing predicate
unfold or an incompatible specification.
One of the limitations that can arise during checking of entailments, particu-
larly when assertions contain complex set expressions, is that the SMT-solver is
unable to decide pure assertions before a reasonable timeout. It is not the case that
all entailments sent to the solver are expected to be correct, because the existential
variable instantiation can choose the wrong variables on the first attempt. If the
SMT solver timeout was globally extended, then the total verification time would
be vastly increased. Therefore it can be desirable to have variable timeouts. For
instance, the symbolic execution of a procedure call may require showing the en-
tailment of a complex pre-condition and the SMT solver may need 200ms. However
a simple dereferencing operation may succeed in under 50ms.
An approach that is often necessary for complex inductive proofs or pure en-
tailments that stretch the SMT solvers’ capabilities is to use lemmas in the form
of auxiliary procedure calls. This approach is also used by VeriFast. As discussed
in Section 6.6.1, if a procedure is defined using only ghost statements or skip, then
an implication has been proved between the pre- and post-condition. The use of
lemmas has been explored in more detail in the extensions presented in [27].
The verification of more complex programs, where the symbolic state contains
a large number of distinct variables, can have a significant cost in terms of veri-
fication time. This is because of the simple heuristic decisions that are made by
Crowfoot for instantiating existentially quantified variables, and the possibility of
backtracking. The chance of the correct variable being chosen will be rare if the
more intelligent instantiation rules do not apply.
There is scope for improving the level of automation, and also the efficiency of
the verification. Predicates could be intelligently unfolded/folded by the system.
For instance when a post-condition includes a predicate instance that is not present
in the state after symbolic execution, the prover could try to fold. Additionally, if
a program statement uses a variable that appears in the arguments of a predicate
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instance, and the symbolic execution gets stuck, that predicate instance could be
unfolded.
The available configurations of hints cover most of the cases where the en-
tailment prover may need to “guess” instantiations for existentially quantified
variables. The exception is at the point when the symbolic execution of a proce-
dure has completed and the symbolic heap is checked against the post-condition.
It would be trivial to extend the current system of hints to allow the guiding of
the instantiation of existential variables in the post-condition.
9 Future work
The following extensions would permit the verification of more examples. Firstly,
as the antiframe rule is consistent with the logic used here (as proved in [42]),
annotations similar to those for the deep frame rule could be implemented to al-
low hiding of invariants in “antiframe style”. Although we do not need it for deep
framing like VeriFast does, second order logic would support the specification of
parametric procedures. A minor but useful extension is to allow proper functions
with result values. The already quite general Lemma 7 can be generalised to sup-
port mutually recursive definitions and to allow deep framing onto abstract (uni-
versally quantified) predicates. To achieve this, for each abstract predicate P one
can also define another abstract predicate P⊗Ψ with a corresponding equivalence
∀x,α. P(x;α)⊗Ψ ⇔ P⊗Ψ(x;α). There is scope for improving the efficiency of
the automate procedure regarding disjunctions, see e.g. [22]. Some support for the
“magic wand” could simplify the verification of programs that manipulate more
complex data structures like e.g. trees. Some suggestions and ideas have been pro-
posed recently in [9,39,31]. A semantic checker could be added that verifies that a
recursive predicate declaration is actually an instance of a pattern that guarantees
the predicate’s existence. Such a pattern is described in [16].
Finally, there are some possible enhancements relating to hints. Firstly, it is
likely that many fold/unfold annotations can be discovered automatically, as done
in [17]. Next, in addition to the advanced hints in Section 6.6 that were intro-
duced to support verification of reflective programs, we plan to investigate what
further extensions are required to support reasoning about more features of re-
flection. Lastly, looking at hints in a more general sense, the need for advanced
hints discussed in Section 6.6 suggests that a more conceptual approach regarding
user interaction (ghost statements) in entailment proofs might be beneficial. For
instance, one could provide “hooks” in all entailment based algorithms for explicit
folding/unfolding, splitting, and lemma application. Alternatively, one could try
to embed our logic in an existing theorem prover and define tactics (or tacticals)
corresponding to our proof search algorithms. This would automatically provide
flexibility regarding extensions with new advanced hints.
In terms of reducing the burden on the human verifier, it may be desirable to
integrate some form of invariant and specification synthesis to alleviate the need
to provide loop invariants and pre- and post-conditions. It would be interesting
to explore whether techniques such as “shape analysis”, which have already been
demonstrated to lend themselves to separation logic [20,11], still apply in a higher-
order store environment. In particular, whether one can automatically infer the
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“deepframe” invariants that currently must be provided to call and code-store
commands.
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Appendices
In the Appendices we present a collection of all the rules used (and not always discussed in
the main text) as well as selected soundness proofs of Crowfoot’s proof search rules in terms
of the “core” Hoare rules of the logic for higher-order store.
A Core rules
A.1 Rules for Hoare triples
A.1.1 Syntax Driven Rules for Triples
For the sake of brevity, we often drop the contexts Π and/or Σ, resp., where they do not play
any role.
assign
{P}x := e{∃x′ . x = e[x\x′] ? P [x\x′]}
lookup{
P ? eA 7→ e′
}
x := [eA]
{∃x′ . x = e′[x\x′] ? (eA 7→ e′)[x\x′] ? P [x\x′]}
heap-assign
{e 7→ } [eA] := e′
{
eA 7→ e′
}
heap2heap-assign{
e 7→ C ? e′ 7→ } [eA] := [e′A]{eA 7→ C ? e′A 7→ C}
new
{P}x := new e{∃x′ . x 7→ e[x\x′] ? P [x\x′]} dispose{eA 7→ } dispose eA {emp}
Call
Π `` (∀y. {A} k(p) {B})⇒ {P} k(eV) {Q}
Π;Σ, {A}F(p) {B} `` {P} call F(eV) {Q}
y = fv(A,p, B) k fresh
Eval
P ⇒ eA 7→ {P} · (eV) {Q} ? true
{P} eval [eA](eV) {Q}
skip
{P} skip {P}
StoreProc
{A}F(p) {B} `` {eA 7→ } [eA] := F(t)
{
eA 7→ (∀p|U ,y. {A} · (p|U ) {B}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
}
where |t| = |p| and ti either value expression ai or ; y = fv(A,B)− p;
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X
scomp
Π;Γ `` {P}C1 {R} Π;Γ `` {R}C2 {Q}
Π;Γ `` {P}C1;C2 {Q}
if
Π;Γ `` {P ∧ eV = e′V }C1 {Q} Π;Γ `` {P ∧ eV 6= e′V }C2 {Q}
Π;Γ `` {P} if eV = e′V then C1 else C2 {Q}
while1
Π;Γ `` {I ∧ eV = e′V }C {I}
Π;Γ `` {I}while eV = e′V do C
{
I ∧ eV 6= e′V
} while2 Π;Γ `` {I ∧ eV 6= e′V }C {I}
Π;Γ `` {I}while eV 6= e′V do C
{
I ∧ eV = e′V
}
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A.1.2 Non-syntax driven Rules for Triples
Disjunction-Precond
Π;Γ `` {P1}C {Q} Π;Γ `` {P2}C {Q}
Π;Γ `` {P1 ∨ P2}C {Q}
Skolemize
Π;Γ `` {P [v\v0]}C {Q} ⇒ {∃v.P}C {Q} v0 is fresh
False
{false}C {Q}
ShallowFrame
Π;Γ `` {P}C {Q}
Π;Γ `` {P ? R}C {Q ? R} mod(C) ∩ fv(R) = ∅
A.1.3 Rules that use Predicate or Procedure Declaration Context
Consequence
Π;Γ `` {P ′}C {Q′}
Π;Γ `` {P}C {Q} Π `` P ⇒ P
′ and Π `` Q′ ⇒ Q
deepframe
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} , {P ◦ Φ}F(p) {Q ◦ Φ} `` B
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} `` B
A.2 Rules for Entailments between Assertions
For the sake of brevity, instead of Π ` A⇒ B we simply write A⇒ B where Π does not play
any role (and analogously for ⇔ and ⇐).
A.2.1 Separation Logic Axioms
?-Commutative
A ∗ Φ⇔ Φ ∗A
?-Associative
A ∗ (B ∗ Φ)⇔ (A ∗B) ∗ Φ
emp-Unit
A ∗ emp⇔ A
?-Monotonicity
Π ` Φ⇒ Θ
Π ` Φ ? A⇒ Θ ? A
∃-∗Distribution
(∃v.Φ) ? Θ ⇔ ∃v.(Φ ? Θ) if v is not free in Θ
7→-Group
Π ` eA 7→ C1, . . . ,Cn ⇔ eA 7→ C1 ? eA + 1 7→ C1 ? . . . ? eA + n− 1 7→ Cn
Purify
Φ ⇔ purify(Φ) ? Φ
Closure
Φ ⇔ closure(Φ)
?-SplitPureLeft
A ? Φ⇒ A if Φ is pure
?-SplitPureRight
A ∧ (true ? Φ)⇒ A ? Φ if Φ is pure
A.2.2 Distribution laws for deep framing
⊗-Triple
{P} e(e) {Q} ⊗R ⇔ {P ◦R} e(e) {Q ◦R}
⊗-Connectives
(P ⊕Q)⊗R⇔ (P ⊗R)⊕ (Q⊗R) where ⊕ ∈ {∨, ?}
⊗-Quantors
(κv.P )⊗R ⇔ κv.(P ⊗R) where κ ∈ {∀,∃}, provided v not free in R
◦-Definition
(P ◦R) ⇔ (P ⊗R) ? R
Symbolic execution proofs for higher order store programs 59
The following rule is used to prove the Plotkin Lemma needed to show Lemma 7 and
Lemma 8.
RUnique
∀y. (R[X\P])(y)⇔ P(y) ∀y. (R[X\Q])(y)⇔ Q(y)
P(y)⇔ Q(yz)
where R is an assertion with a free predicate variable X (used with the appropriate arity) from
the pattern as described in [16] (so in particular it cannot be X itself) that guarantees that R
has a fixpoint.
A.2.3 Rules that use Predicate declaration Context
PredLeft
∀y. Π, (X(y)⇔ P ) `` P ⇒ X(y)
PredRight
Π, (X(y)⇔ P ) `` X(y)⇒ P
A.2.4 Inductive Rules for Inductive Predicates
ListInduction
recdef L(s, t, α) := Q ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ Q) `` s = t ? α = ∅ ⇒ P
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ Q) ``
(
P [s, α\n, β] ? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n ?
A1 ? · · · ? AN ? α = {(E1, . . . , Ek)} ∪ β
)
⇒ P
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ Q) `` L(s, t, α)⇒ P n,v, β /∈ fv(P )
Join
recdef L(s, t, α) := P ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ P ) `` L(e1, e, eα) ? L(e, e2, eβ)⇒ L(e1, e2, eα ∪ eβ)
Split
recdef L(s, t, α) := P ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CM ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ P ) `` (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ eˆγ ? L(eˆ1, eˆ2, eˆγ)⇒
∃s, n,v, α, β.

L(eˆ1, s, α)
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, eˆ2, β)
? eˆγ = α ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ β
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek

Let us prove soundness of the Split rule. We will prove the particular case where E1 is
the variable s used as the address of the first list node in the segment, which ensures that L is
splittable. Other cases are similar.
Proof We use the (ListInduction) rule, taking P to be
(e1, . . . , ek) ∈ α⇒
∃a, n,v, α1, α2.
L(s, a, α1)
? a 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, z, α2)
? α = α1 ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ α2
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek
(20)
Thus for the “base case” we need to prove
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ Q) `` s = t?α = ∅ ⇒

(e1, . . . , ek) ∈ α⇒
∃a, n,v, α1, α2.
L(s, a, α1)
? a 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, z, α2)
? α = α1 ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ α2
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek

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which is easily seen to hold because α = ∅ together with (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ α is inconsistent. Then
for the inductive case we need to show
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ Q)``
P [s, α\n, β]
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? α = {(E1, . . . , Ek)} ∪ β
⇒

(e1, . . . , ek) ∈ α⇒
∃a, n,v, α1, α2.
L(s, a, α1)
? a 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, z, α2)
? α = α1 ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ α2
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek

which amounts to
Π, (L(s, t, α)⇔ Q)`` s = t ? α = ∅ ∨

∃n,v, β .
s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? P(n, t, β)
? α = {(E1, . . . , Ek)} ∪ β
 [s, α\n, β]

? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? α = {(E1, . . . , Ek)} ∪ β
? (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ α
⇒
∃a, n,v, α1, α2.
L(s, a, α1)
? a 7→ C1, . . . ,CM , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, z, α2)
? α = α1 ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ α2
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek
A.2.5 Rules for entailment between behavioural specifications
Where these rules do not require Π it will be omitted.
ShallowFrameProcedures
{P} k(eV) {Q} ⇒ {P ? R} k(eV) {Q ? R}
ConsequenceProcedures
Π `` P ⇒ P ′ Π `` Q′ ⇒ Q
Π `` {P ′} k(eV){Q′}⇒ {P} k(eV) {Q}
Disjunction
Π `` A⇒ {P1} k(eV) {Q} Π `` A⇒ {P2} k(eV) {Q}
Π `` A⇒ {P1 ∨ P2} k(eV) {Q}
Skolem
{Φ[v\v0]} k(eV) {Q} ⇒ {∃v.Φ} k(eV) {Q} v0 fresh
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B Symbolic execution rules
B.1 Atomic statements
Assign
Π;Γ .
{
x = ev [x\x′] ? Υ [x\x′]
}
C {Q}
Π;Γ . {Υ}x := ev ; C {Q}
x′ fresh
Lookup
purify(Υ ) `SMT EA = (e′A + o)
Π;Γ .
{
x = (eV [x\x′]) ? Υ ? eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, eV ,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′]
}
C {Q}
Π;Γ .
{
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, eV ,Co+1, . . . ,Cn
}
x := [EA]; C {Q}
x′ fresh
Mutate
purify(Υ ) `SMT EA = (e′A + o)
Π;Γ .
{
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, x,Co+1 . . . ,Cn
}
C {Q}
Π;Γ .
{
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn
}
[EA] := x; C {Q}
Copy
purify(Υ ) `SMT E1 = (eA + o) purify(Υ ) `SMT E2 = (e′A + o′)
Π;Γ .
{
eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1,C ′o′ ,Co+1, . . . ,Cm ?
e′A 7→ C ′0, . . . ,C ′n ? Υ
}
C
{
Q
}
Π;Γ .
{
eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Cm ?
e′A 7→ C ′0, . . . ,C ′n ? Υ
}
[E1] := [E2]; C
{
Q
} 0 ≤ o ≤ m, 0 ≤ o′ ≤ n
New
Π;Γ .
{
Υ [x\x′] ? x 7→ (e0, . . . , en)[x\x′]
}
C {Q}
Π;Γ . {Υ}x := new e0, . . . , en; C {Q}
x′ fresh
Dispose
purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = (e′A + o) Π;Γ .
{
Υ ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1 ?
(e′A + o+ 1) 7→ Co+1, . . . ,Cn
}
C
{
Q
}
Π;Γ .
{
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn
}
dispose eA; C {Q}
0 ≤ o ≤ n
Call
(∀a. {P} · (t) {Q}) [b\y] ⊗ Ψ `find-post {Υ} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φ
}
Π; ∀a,b. {P}F(t) {Q} , Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φ[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π; ∀a,b. {P}F(t) {Q} , Γ . {Υ} call F(t′) ‘b = y’ deepframe Ψ ; C {Q′} v′i fresh
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EvalUnguided
Π : Υ `find-tr ∃u. eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} [u\w] `find-post {Υ ? Rpure [u\w]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
Π;Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π;Γ . {Υ} eval [eA](t′); C
{
Q′
} v′i ,w fresh
Eval
Π : Υ `Gfind-tr ∃y. eA 7→ ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
(∀p. {A} · (s) {B}) [q\E] `find-post
{
Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} · (s′){ m∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
}
purify(closure(Θi[wi\w′i ])) `SMT false for all i 6= k
(∀a. {P} · (t) {Q}) [b\e][y\y′] `find-post
{
Θk[wk\w′k]
} · (t′){ m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
Π;Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π; ∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ . { Υ } eval [eA](t′) ‘b = ebefore lookup G
after lookup L(s′) q = E ’; C
{
Q′
}
y′,v′i ,w
′
i freshL is a lemma procedure
Skip1
Π;Γ . {Υ}C {Q}
Π;Γ . {Υ} skip; C {Q}
StoreCode
S = (∀p|U ,y. {P ◦ Ψ} · (p|U ) {Q ◦ Ψ}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = e′A + o
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} . {Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} . { Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn } [eA] := F(t)‘deepframe Ψ ’; C {Q′ }
where |t| = |p| and ti either value expression ai or ; y = fv(P ◦ Ψ,Q ◦ Ψ)− p;
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X for any X
StoreCodeGuided
Π : ((Φ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′] `∅Gpre X(E) ? Φ′
Π : (((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′]) ? emp a`∅
Gpost
Y (e) ? Θ′
S =
 ∀p|U ,y.
{ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v] }
·(p|U ){ ∃w,a′. (Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w] }
 [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = e′A + o
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . {Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . { Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn }
[eA] := F(t)
‘deepframe ∃a. Υ ′
pre Gpre
post Gpost ’; C
{
Q′
}
where |t| = |p| and ti either value expression ai or ;
y = fv(S-precondition, S-postcondition)− p; v′,w′,a′,v′′,w′′ fresh
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X for any X
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B.2 Ghost statements
GhostFold
Π : Υ `IG X(e) ? Θ Π;Γ . {X(e) ? Θ}C {Q}
Π;Γ . {Υ} ghost fold X(p) b = y; C {Q} G = fold X(p) b = y
GhostUnfold
Π,X(x)⇔ (∃v1.Φ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn.Φn);Γ .
{
n∨
i=1
Υ ? Φi[vi\wi][x\e]
}
C {Q}
Π,X(x)⇔ (∃v1.Φ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn.Φn);Γ . {Υ ? X(e)} ghost unfold X(e′); C {Q}
w1, . . . ,wn fresh
e′i ∈ {ei, ?}
GhostJoin
recdef L(s, t, α) := P ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CK ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
purify(Υ ) `SMT e = e′ Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ P .
{
Υ ? L(e1, e2, eα ∪ eβ)
}
C {Q}
Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ P . {Υ ? L(e1, e, eα) ? L(e′, e2, eβ)} ghost join L e1; C {Q}
GhostSplit
recdef L(s, t, α) := P ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CK ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
Υ `I ∃c1, . . . , ck . (q1, . . . , qk) ∈ eˆγ ? Θ
Π,L(x)⇔ Ψ ;Γ .

Υ ?

L(eˆ, s, α)
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CK , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, eˆ′, β)
? eˆγ = α ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ β
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek
 [s, n,v\w]

C
{
Q
}
Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ P ;Γ . {Υ ? L(eˆ, eˆ′, eˆγ)} ghost split L eˆ (p1, . . . , pk); C {Q}
α, β,w fresh, c1, . . . , ck fresh,
each pi is a value expression or ?,
each qi is
{
ci if pi is ?
pi otherwise
,
each ei is
{
I(ci) if pi is ?
pi otherwise
B.3 Extraordinary rules
Disj
Π;Γ . {Ψ1}C {Q} · · · Π;Γ . {Ψn}C {Q}
Π;Γ . {Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ψn}C {Q}
Skip2
Υ `I ∃w.Φi[vi\w] ? Θpure
{Υ} skip {∃v1.Φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∃vn.Φn}
w fresh
Incons
purify(closure(Υ )) `SMT false
{Υ}C {Q}
AddSkip
Π;Γ . {Υ}C ; skip {Q}
Π;Γ . {Υ}C {Q} C is not a sequential composition
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C Soundness of symbolic execution rules
To prove soundness of the low-level deterministic symbolic execution rules in the following we
will use the already shown sound high-level rules.
C.1 Soundness of Lookup
We derive the low-level lookup rule from the high-level one in Section 4. For the sake of a
simpler presentation we omit the context Π;Γ . The low-level rule is the following:
Lookup
purify(P ) `SMT E = (G+ o){
x = (e[x\x′]) ? (P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′]
}
C {Q}
{P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}x := [E]; C {Q}
1. x′ fresh
Proof. We can assume that:
(a) x′ is fresh
(b) purify(P ) `SMT E = (G+ o)
(c) {x = (e[x\x′]) ? (P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′]}C {Q}
We are then required to show that that we can derive the conclusion of the low-level rule
from the high-level axiom. With some renaming of variables (e, e′, E), and instantiating P , the
axiom becomes:

P ? G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? E 7→ e
 x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ? (E 7→ e)[x\x′] ?P ? G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn
 [x\x′]

We use the following lemma:
Lemma 9 If purify(P )⇒ Rpure then P ⇔ P ? Rpure.
Proof This can easily be derived using (Purify), (?-SplitPureLeft) and the axioms of Sep-
aration Logic.
Using (b), and Theorem 3 (soundness of SMT), we get:
purify(P )⇒ E = (G+ o) (21)
providing the lhs and rhs are both pure. The left is pure by definition of purify( ), and the
right is pure by definition of =.
Using (a), (c), (Skolem), and some renaming we get:{
x = (e[x\x′]) ? (P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′]
}
C {Q}
rename x′ with fresh x0{
(x = (e[x\x′]) ? (P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′])[x′\x0]
}
C {Q}
Skolem{∃x′. x = (e[x\x′]) ? (P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn)[x\x′]}C {Q} (22)
We then reason as follows:
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
P ? G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? E 7→ e
 x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ? (E 7→ e)[x\x′] ?P ? G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn
 [x\x′]

⇒ { Using consequence rule, Lemma 9 with (21) and (?-Monotonicity) }
P ? E = (G+ o) ?
G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? E 7→ e
 x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ? (E 7→ e)[x\x′] ?
P ? E = (G+ o) ?
G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn
 [x\x′]

⇒ { Using consequence rule and lemma for structural definition of substitution }
P ? E = (G+ o) ?
G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? E 7→ e
 x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ?
P ? E = (G+ o) ?
G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? E 7→ e
 [x\x′]

⇒ { Using consequence rule, and substitution with E = G+ o }
P ? E = (G+ o) ?
G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? (G+ o) 7→ e
 x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ?
P ? E = (G+ o) ?
G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? (G+ o) 7→ e
 [x\x′]

⇒ { Using consequence rule, Lemma 9 with (21) and (?-Monotonicity) }

P ? G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ? (G+ o) 7→ e
 x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ?
P ? G 7→ C0 ? . . . ?
(G+ o− 1) 7→ Co−1 ?
(G+ o+ 1) 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ?
(G+ n) 7→ Cn ?
(G+ o) 7→ e
 [x\x′]

⇒ { Using consequence rule and (7→-Group) }{
P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,
Co+1, . . .Cn
}
x := [E]

∃x′. x = e[x\x′] ?(
P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,
Co+1, . . .Cn
)
[x\x′]

⇒ {Using sequential composition and (22)}
{P ? G 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, e,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}x := [E]; C {Q}
C.2 Soundness of Eval-rules
We show that the implemented unguided rule EvalUnguided can be derived from the high-
level (Eval). Again for the sake of a simpler presentation we omit the context Π;Γ . The
low-level rule is as follows:
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EvalUnguided
Π : Υ `find-tr ∃u. eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} [u\w] `find-post {Υ ? Rpure [u\w]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
Π;Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π;Γ . {Υ} eval [eA](t′); C
{
Q′
} v′i ,w fresh
Proof. We can assume that:
(a) v′i and w are fresh
(b) Υ `find-tr ∃x. eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
(c) ∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} [u\w] `find-post {Υ ? Rpure [x\w]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
(d) Π;Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C {Q′}
By applying (Skolem) to (d) (using assumption (a)), we get:
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
C
{
Q′
}
(23)
By soundness of `find-tr and (b), we get:
Υ ⇒ ∃u. eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t′) {Q} ? Rpure ? P ′′ (24)
for some P ′′.
By soundness of `find-post and (c), we get:
(∀a. {P} k(t) {Q}) [x\w]⇒ {Υ ? Rpure [x\w]} k(t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
(25)
for some fresh variable k.
To derive our low-level rule, we use the following instance of the high-level rule,
Υ ⇒ eA 7→ {Υ} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
? true
{Υ} eval [eA](t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
We now proceed to show that the premise holds:
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Υ
⇒ { By (24) }
∃u. eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t′) {Q} ? Rpure ? P ′′
⇒ {By (Skolem) }
eA 7→ ∀a. {P} · (t′) {Q} [u\w] ? Rpure [u\w] ? P ′′[u\w]
⇒ { By (25) and (?-Monotonicity) }
eA 7→ ∀a. {Υ ? Rpure [x\w]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
? Rpure [x\w] ? P ′′[u\w]
⇒ { By property of true and (?-Monotonicity) }
eA 7→ ∀a. {Υ ? Rpure [u\w]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
? true
⇒ { By (Consequence), and Υ ⇒ Υ ? Rpure [u\w] as shown separately }
eA 7→ ∀a. {Υ} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
? true
We still need to show Υ ⇒ Υ ?Rpure [u\w]. From (24) we can derive that Υ ⇒ ∃u. Rpure ?
true and so by skolemisation Υ ⇒ Rpure [u\w] ? true as w is fresh. By (?-SplitPureRight)
one obtains the desired result.
We thus get by the high-level (Eval) rule instantiated as shown above:
{Υ} eval [eA](t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi. Φi
}
⇒ {Using sequential composition (SComp) and (23)}
{Υ} eval [eA](t′); C
{
Q′
}
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C.3 Soundness of guided Eval
We now show that the Eval rule, with full hints, is sound. The rule is as follows:
Eval
Π : Υ `Gfind-tr ∃y. eA 7→ ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
(∀p. {A} · (s) {B}) [q\E] `find-post
{
Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} · (s′){ n∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
}
purify(closure(Θi[wi\w′i ])) `SMT false for all i 6= k
(∀a. {P} · (t) {Q}) [b\e][y\y′] `find-post
{
Θk[wk\w′k]
} · (t′){ m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
Π; ∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π; ∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ . { Υ } eval [eA](t′) ‘b = ebefore lookup G
after lookup L(s′) q = E ’; C
{
Q′
}
x′,v′i ,w
′
i freshL is a lemma procedure
Proof. We can assume that:
(a) x′,v′i ,w
′
i fresh
(b) L is a lemma
(c) Π : Υ `Gfind-tr ∃x. E 7→ ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure
(d) (∀p. {A} · (s) {B}) [q\E] `find-post {Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} · (s′)
{
n∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
}
(e) purify(closure(Θi[wi\w′i ])) `SMT false for all i 6= k
(f) (∀a. {P} · (t) {Q}) [y\y′][b\e] `find-post
{
Θk[wk\w′k]
} · (t′){ m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
(g) Π; ∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ .
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C {Q′}
By soundness of `find-tr and (c), we get:
Υ ⇒ ∃y. E 7→ ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure ? Υ ′ for some Υ ′ (26)
By soundness of `find-post and (d), we get:
(∀p. {A} k(s) {B}) [q\E]⇒ {Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} k(s′){ n∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
}
(27)
for a fresh k.
By Theorem 3 (soundness of `SMT ) and (e), we get:
purify(closure(Θi[wi\w′i ]))⇒ false for all i 6= k
which, by Lemma 11 gives:
Θi[wi\w′i ]⇒ false for all i 6= k (28)
By soundness of `find-post and (f), we get:
(∀a. {P} · (t) {Q}) [y\y′][b\e]⇒ {Θk[wk\w′k]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
(29)
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By soundness of our symbolic execution rules and (g), we get:
Π;∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ |=
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
(30)
We prove this rule using the following instance of rule (EvalUnguided) already proved
sound in the previous subsection.
Π : Υ ⇒ ∃y. eA 7→ ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure ? Υ ′
∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} [y\y′]⇒ {Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} · (t′){ m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
Π;∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ |=
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C
{
Q′
}
Π; ∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ |= {Υ} eval [eA](t′); C
{
Q′
} v′i ,y′ fresh
Because the annotations have no computational effect, the conclusions are identical.
We then must prove that the premises hold:
(a’) Π : Υ ⇒ eA 7→ ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} ? Rpure ? Υ ′
(b’) ∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} [y\y′]⇒ {Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} · (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
(c’) Π;∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B} , Γ |=
{
m∨
i=1
Φi[vi\v′i ]
}
C {Q′}
We have (a’) from (26). We have (c’) from (30). This leaves us to show that (b’) holds.
We’ll use this lemma:
Lemma 10 Υ ? Rpure [y\y′] ⇒
n∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
Proof From the procedure context of our assumptions, we have
∀p,q. {A}L(s) {B}
which, by universal instantiation is
∀p. {A}L(s) {B} [q\E]
By the fact that lemma specifications hold for skip, we know
∀p. {A} skip {B} [q\E]
From (27) we get, {
Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} skip{ n∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
}
which by the semantic fact that {P} skip {Q} ⇐⇒ P ⇒ Q means that the lemma holds.
We can then prove the final premise we needed (b’):
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∀a,b. {P} · (t) {Q} [y\y′]
⇒ {Universal instantiation}
∀a. {P} · (t) {Q} [y\y′][b\e]
⇒ {By (29)}{
Θk[wk\w′k]
} · (t′){ m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
⇒ {By (ConsequenceProcedures) and (28)}{
n∨
i=1
Θi[wi\w′i ]
}
· (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
⇒ {By (Skolemize) with w′i fresh}{
n∨
i=1
∃wi.Θi
}
· (t′)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
⇒ {By (ConsequenceProcedures) and Lemma 10}{
Υ ? Rpure [y\y′]} · (t′){ m∨
i=1
∃vi.Φi
}
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C.4 Soundness of StoreCode
Here we prove soundness of the symbolic execution rule StoreCode (in Section B) using the
core rule StoreProc (Section 4).
S = (∀p|U ,y. {P ◦ Ψ} · (p|U ) {Q ◦ Ψ}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = e′A + o
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} . {Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} . { Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn } [eA] := F(t)‘deepframe Ψ ’; C {Q′ }
where |t| = |p| and ti either value expression ai or ; y = fv(P ◦ Ψ,Q ◦ Ψ)− p;
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X
So let us assume that the premises and side conditions of this rule hold. In particular for the
third premise this means
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} |= {Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′} (31)
What we need to prove is
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} |= { Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn } [eA] := F(t); C {Q′ }
because the deepframe annotation has no computational effect. By the soundness of the (scomp)
rule and (31) it will be enough to show
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} |=
{
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn
}
[eA] := F(t){
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn
}
By the second premise, Lemma 9 and Theorem 3 we have Υ ⇔ Υ ?eA = e′A+o so by soundness
of (consequence) the above will follow from
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} |=
{
Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn ? eA = e′A+o
}
[eA] := F(t){
Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn ? eA = e′A+o
}
The above will follow, by the soundness of (7→-Group) and (ShallowFrame), from
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} |=
{
e′A+o 7→ Co ? eA = e′A+o
}
[eA] := F(t){
e′A+o 7→ S ? eA = e′A+o
}
By the soundness of (consequence) and (ShallowFrame), and Υ ⇔ Υ ? eA = e′A+o again,
the above will follow from
Π;Γ, {P}F(p) {Q} |= {eA 7→ } [eA] := F(t) {eA 7→ S}
By the soundness of (deepframe) the above will follow from
Π;Γ, {P ◦ Ψ}F(p) {Q ◦ Ψ} |= {eA 7→ } [eA] := F(t) {eA 7→ S} (32)
Take the following instance of the (StoreProc) rule:
{P ◦ Ψ}F(p) {Q ◦ Ψ} ``
{
eA 7→
}
[eA] := F(t){
eA 7→ (∀p|U ,y. {P ◦ Ψ} · (p|U ) {Q ◦ Ψ}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
}
But in fact, using the equation for S and the soundness of (StoreProc), this gives us (32)
which is what we needed to prove.
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C.5 Soundness of StoreCodeGuided
Here we prove soundness of the symbolic execution rule StoreCodeGuided (in Section B)
using the core rule StoreProc (Section 4).
StoreCodeGuided
Π : ((Φ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′] `∅Gpre X(E) ? Φ′
Π : ((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′] ? emp a`∅
Gpost
Y (e) ? Θ′
S =
 ∀p|U ,y.
{ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v] }
·(p|U ){ ∃w,a′. (Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w] }
 [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = e′A + o
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . {Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . { Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn }
[eA] := F(t)
‘deepframe ∃a. Υ ′
pre Gpre
post Gpost ’; C
{
Q′
}
where ti either value expression ai or ;
y = fv(S-precondition, S-postcondition)− p; v′,w′,a′,v′′,w′′ fresh
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X
Due to the premises of the rule we can assume that:
(a) Π : ((Φ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′] `∅Gpre X(E) ? Φ′
(b) Π : ((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′] ? emp a`∅
Gpost
Y (e) ? Θ′
(c) S =
 ∀p|U ,y.
{ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v] }
·(p|U ){ ∃w,a′. (Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w] }

(d) purify(Υ ) `SMT eA = e′A + o
(e) Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} . {Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
By soundness of `I and (a) we get:
Π : ((Φ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′]⇒ X(E) ? Φ′
where fv(Φ′) ⊆ fv(((Φ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′]) (33)
By soundness of `I and (b) we get:
Π : ((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′] ? emp⇔ Y (e) ? Θ′
where fv(Θ′) ⊆ fv(((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′] ? emp) (34)
By Theorem 3 and (d) we get:
purify(Υ )⇒ eA = e′A + o (35)
By the soundness of our symbolic execution rules and (e) we get:
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} |= {Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′} (36)
We now prove that this rule can be derived from the following instance of the previous
unguided StoreCode:
S =
(∀p|U ,y. {∃v.Φ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′} · (p|U ){∃w.Θ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
purify(Υ )⇒ eA = e′A + o
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} |= {Υ ? E′ 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} |= { Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Cn } [eA] := F(t)‘deepframe ∃a.Υ ′’; C {Q′ }
where ti either value expression ai or ; y = fv(∃v.Φ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′, ∃w.Θ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′)− p;
p = (pi)i∈I ; U = {i ∈ I | ti = } p|X = (pi)i∈I∩X
Symbolic execution proofs for higher order store programs 73
Because the annotations have no computational effect, the conclusions are identical. Next
to show the premises hold:
(a’) S = (∀p|U ,y. {∃v.Φ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′} · (p|U ) {∃w.Θ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′}) [p|I\U\t|I\U ]
(b’) purify(Υ )⇒ eA = e′A + o
(c’) Π;Γ, {∃v.Φ}F(p) {∃w.Θ} |= {Υ ? e′A 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, S,Co+1, . . . ,Cn}C {Q′}
(b’) is shown by (35), and (c’) is from (36). To show (a’) we need to show the following
implication between triples:
{ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v] }
·(p|U ){ ∃w,a′. (Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w] }
⇒
{ ∃v.Φ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′ }
·(p|U ){ ∃w.Θ ◦ ∃a.Υ ′ }
This will follow from the soundness of (ConsequenceProcedures) once we show the two
premises. First we show the implication for the precondition:
Π : ∃v. Φ ◦ (∃a.Υ ′)⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
This is equivalent to
∃v. Φ ◦ (∃a.Υ ′)⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
⇔ {◦-Definition}
∃v. (Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? (∃a.Υ ′)⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
⇔ { Rename bound a by a fresh a0}
∃v. (Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? (∃a0.Υ ′[a\a0])⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
⇔ { ∃-∗Distribution with a0 freshness}
∃v,a0. (Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a0]⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
Using ∃-introduction on the left and the freshness of a′, it suffices to prove
∃v. ((Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a0])[a0\a′]⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
Or equivalently
∃v. ((Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a0])[a0\a′]⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
⇔ { Substitution distribution with a0 freshness}
∃v. (Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a0][a0\a′]⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
⇔ { Substitution}
∃v. (Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a′]⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
Which, by skolemization and the freshness of v′ leaves us to prove
((Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′]⇒ ∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v] (37)
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This is shown below:
((Φ⊗(∃a.Υ ′)) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[v\v′]
⇒ {By (33)}
X(E) ? Φ′
⇒ {Rename v with fresh v′′}
(X(E) ? Φ′)[v\v′′]
⇒ {Substitution distribution with v ∩ Φ′ = ∅ (from (33))}
(X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)
⇒ {Rename a′ with a fresh a0}
(X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[a′\a0]
⇒ {∃-introduction}
∃a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)
⇒ {Rename v′ with v (v ∩ Φ′ = ∅ (from (33)))}
∃a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
⇒ {Rename v with a fresh v0}
∃a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v][v\v0]
⇒ {∃-introduction}
∃v,a′. (X(E)[v\v′′] ? Φ′)[v′\v]
Next, we show the entailment for the postcondition
Π : ∃w,a′. (Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w]⇒ ∃w.Θ ◦ (∃a.Υ ′)
By skolemization and choosing a fresh a1,w1 leaves us to prove
(Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w][a′\a1][w\w1]⇒ ∃w.Θ ◦ (∃a.Υ ′) (38)
This is proved below
(Y (e)[w\w′′] ? Θ′)[w′\w][a′\a1][w\w1]
⇒ { Substitution distribution with w ∩Θ′ = ∅ (from (34)) }
(Y (e) ? Θ′)[w\w′′][w′\w][a′\a1][w\w1]
⇒ { from (34) }
((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′][w\w′′][w′\w][a′\a1][w\w1]
⇒ { remove redundant substitution [w\w′′] (all w have been substituted)}
((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a′])[w\w′][w′\w][a′\a1][w\w1]
⇒ { apply substitution [a′\a1] with a′ freshness (so not already appearing) }
((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a1])[w\w′][w′\w][w\w1]
⇒ { apply substitutions [w\w′][w′\w] with w′ freshness (so not already appearing) }
((Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a1])[w\w1]
⇒ { ∃-introduction }
∃w. (Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? Υ ′[a\a1]
⇒ { ∃-introduction with ?-Monotonicity }
∃w. (Θ⊗∃a.Υ ′) ? ∃a.Υ ′
⇒ {◦-Definition}
∃w. Θ ◦ (∃a.Υ ′)
Thus, by applying ConsequenceProcedures to (c) with (37) and (38), we get (a’).
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D Proofs of soundness of rules for entailments between disjuncts
The general pattern for proving a rule
Φ′ `I′ ∃v′ . Ψ ′ ? Θ′
Φ `I ∃v . Ψ ? Θ S
(where the side conditions S depend only on Φ,v, Ψ) is as follows.
1. Assume that fv(Φ) ∩ v = ∅ and assume that the side conditions S hold.
2. Prove that fv(Φ′) ∩ v′ = ∅.
3. Assume further that:
(a’) Φ′ ⇒ Ψ ′[v′\I′(v′)] ? Θ′
(b’) fv(Θ′) ⊆ fv(Φ′)
(c’) dom(I′) = v′
4. Prove that:
(a) Φ ⇒ Ψ [v\I(v)] ? Θ
(b) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c) dom(I) = v
We include three such proofs, for the rules InstUsingEq, CancelPt1 and InstMatchAddr.
We begin with InstUsingEq.
InstUsingEq
Φ `I ∃v . Ψ [v\e] ? Θ
Φ `I[v:=e] ∃v, v . Ψ ? v = e ? Θ
fv(e) ∩ v, v = ∅
Proof As per 1. we can assume that fv(Φ)∩ v, v = ∅ and that fv(e)∩ v, v = ∅. For 2. we need
to prove fv(Φ) ∩ v = ∅, which follows easily from our assumptions. As per 3. we now assume
further that:
(a’) Φ ⇒ Ψ [v\e][v\I(v)] ? Θ
(b’) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c’) dom(I) = v
and for 4. we need to prove:
(a) Φ ⇒ (Ψ ? v = e)[v, v\I[v := e](v, v)] ? Θ
(b) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c) dom(I[v := e]) = v, v
(b) is exactly (b’). (c) follows from (c’). Now to show (a). The following argument shows that
(a) and (a’) are equivalent.
(Ψ ? v = e)[v, v\I[v := e](v, v)] ? Θ
⇔ {distribute substitution over ?}
Ψ [v, v\I[v := e](v, v)] ? (v = e)[v, v\I[v := e](v, v)] ? Θ
⇔ {because fv(e) ∩ v = ∅}
Ψ [v\e][v\I(v)] ? (v = e)[v, v\I[v := e](v, v)] ? Θ
⇔ {because fv(e) ∩ v, v = ∅}
Ψ [v\e][v\I(v)] ? e = e ? Θ
⇔ {because e = e⇔ emp - where does that come from?}
Ψ [v\e][v\I(v)] ? Θ
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Next we tackle the CancelPt1 rule.
CancelPt1
Φ `I ∃v . Ψ ? Θ
Φ ? eA 7→ C `I ∃v . Ψ ? e′A 7→ ? Θ
fv(e′) ∩ v = ∅,
purify(Φ) `SMT e = e′
Proof As per 1. we can assume that fv(Φ?e 7→ C )∩v = ∅, fv(e′)∩v = ∅, and purify(Φ) `SMT
eA = e
′
A. For 2. we need to prove fv(Φ) ∩ v = ∅, which follows easily from our assumptions.
As per 3. we now assume further that:
(a’) Φ ⇒ Ψ [v\I(v)] ? Θ
(b’) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c’) dom(I) = v
and for 4. we need to prove:
(a) Φ ? eA 7→ C ⇒ (Ψ ? e′A 7→ )[v\I(v)] ? Θ
(b) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ ? eA 7→ C )
(c) dom(I) = v
(b) follows easily from (b’). (c) is exactly (c’). Now to show (a).
Φ ? eA 7→ C
⇒ {using purify(Φ) `SMT eA = e′A and what else?}
Φ ? e′A 7→ C
⇒ {using ?-monotonicity to add e′A 7→ C to both sides of (a’)}
Ψ [v\I(v)] ? e′A 7→ C ? Θ
⇒ {using ?-monotonicity and e′A 7→ C ⇒ e′ 7→ }
Ψ [v\I(v)] ? e′A 7→ ? Θ
⇒ {since fv(e′A) ∩ v = ∅}
Ψ [v\I(v)] ? (e′A 7→ )[v\I(v)] ? Θ
⇒ {since fv(e′A) ∩ v = ∅}
Ψ [v\I(v)] ? (e′A 7→ )[v\I(v)] ? Θ
⇒ {using distribution of substitution and ?}
(Ψ ? e′A 7→ )[v\I(v)] ? Θ
Next we prove the InstMatchAddr rule.
InstMatchAddr
Φ ? eA 7→ C `I ∃v . (Ψ ? v 7→ C ′)[v\eA] ? Θ
Φ ? eA 7→ C `I[v:=eA] ∃v, v . Ψ ? v 7→ C ′ ? Θ
backtracks
Proof As per 1. we can assume that fv(Φ ? eA 7→ C ) ∩ v, v = ∅. For 2. we need to prove
fv(Φ ? eA 7→ C ) ∩ v = ∅, which follows easily.
As per 3. we now assume further that:
(a’) Φ ? eA 7→ C ⇒ (Ψ ? v 7→ C ′)[v\eA][v\I(v)] ? Θ
(b’) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ ? eA 7→ C )
(c’) dom(I) = v
and for 4. we need to prove:
(a) Φ ? eA 7→ C ⇒ (Ψ ? v 7→ C ′)[v, v\I[v := eA](v, v)] ? Θ
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(b) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ ? e 7→ C )
(c) dom(I[v := eA]) = v, v
(b) is exactly (b’) and (c) follows easily from (c’). The following argument shows that (a) and
(a’) are equivalent.
(Ψ ? v 7→ C ′)[v\eA][v\I(v)] ? Θ
⇔ { since fv(eA) ∩ v = ∅ which follows from fv(Φ ? eA 7→ C ) ∩ v, v = ∅ }
(Ψ ? v 7→ C ′)[v, v\I[v := eA](v, v)] ? Θ
FoldPredRight
(X(x)⇔ (∃v1. Υ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn. Υn)) ∈ Π
Υ1[x\e][v1\d1] ? Θ `∅ Φ ? emp . . . Υn[x\e][vn\dn] ? Θ `∅ Φ ? emp
Π : X(e) ? Θ `∅G Φ ? emp
d1 . . .dn fresh
G = fold X( )
Proof We have no existential variables, so 2. comes for free. As per 3. we now assume further
that:
(a’) Υi[x\e][vi\di] ? Θ ⇒ Φ ? emp forall i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(b’) fv(emp) ⊆ fv(Υ1[x\e][v1\d1] ? Θ)
(c’) dom(∅) = ∅
and for 4. we need to prove:
(a) X(e) ? Θ ⇒ Φ ? emp
(b) fv(emp) ⊆ fv(X(e) ? Θ)
(c) dom(∅) = ∅
(b) and (c) holds trivially.
By skolemization from (a’) and the fact that d1, . . . ,dn are fresh, and that fv(Θ)∩vi = ∅,
we get:
∃vi. Υi[x\e] ? Θ ⇒ Φ ? emp forall i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (39)
The following argument proves (a)
X(e) ? Θ
⇒ {PredRight with premise}
((∃v1. Υ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn. Υn))[x\e] ? Θ
⇒ {Substitution distribution}
((∃v1. Υ1[x\e]) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn. Υn[x\e])) ? Θ
⇒ {?-distribution}
(∃v1. Υ1[x\e] ? Θ) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn. Υn[x\e] ? Θ)
⇒ {Rewrite}
∃vi. Υi[x\e] ? Θ forall i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
⇒ {By (39)}
Φ ? emp
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Next we’ll do the FoldPredLeft rule.
FoldPredLeft
X(v)⇔ (∃v1,b1. Υ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (∃vn,bn. Υn) ∈ Π
Φ `I ∃w, c. Υi[v\q][b\y][vi\w] ? Θ
Π : Φ `∅G X(e) ? Θ
1. G = fold X(p) b = y,
2. bi ⊆ b, 3. b− bi ∩ (fv(Υi) ∪ p) = ∅
4. 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 5. c,w fresh,
6. each pi is an expression or ?,
7. each qi is
{
ci if pi is ?
pi otherwise
,
8. each ei is
{
I(ci) if pi is ?
pi otherwise
Proof We have no existential variables in the conclusion, so we don’t need assumption 1. For
2. we need to prove fv(Φ) ∩ (w, c) = ∅, which follows from side-condition (5), the freshness of
w
As per 3. we now assume further that:
(a’) Φ ⇒ Υi[x\q][b\y][vi\w][w\I(w)][c\I(c)] ? Θ
(b’) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c’) dom(I) = w, c
and for 4. we need to prove:
(a) Φ ⇒ X(e) ? Θ
(b) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c) dom(∅) = ∅
(b) is exactly (b’), and (c) holds trivially. The following argument shows (a)
Φ
⇒ { From (a’) }
Υi[x\q][b\y][vi\w][w\I(w)][c\I(c)] ? Θ
⇒ { From side-condition 7 (q is ci or pi) }
Υi[x\(c|p)][b\y][vi\w][w\I(w)][c\I(c)] ? Θ
⇒ { Substitution with freshness of c (so not in fv(Υi)) }
Υi[x\(I(c)|p)][b\y][vi\w][w\I(w)] ? Θ
⇒ { From side-condition 8 (e is I(ci) or pi) }
Υi[x\e][b\y][vi\w][w\I(w)] ? Θ
⇒ { From side-condition 2 and 3 }
Υi[x\e][bi\y][vi\w][w\I(w)] ? Θ
⇒ { Substitution with freshness of w (so not in fv(Υi)) }
Υi[x\e][bi\y][vi\I(w)] ? Θ
⇒ { ∃-introduction }
(∃bi. Υi[x\e][vi\I(w)]) ? Θ
⇒ { ∃-introduction }
(∃vi,bi. Υi[x\e]) ? Θ
⇒ { Premise }
X(x)[x\e] ? Θ
⇒ { Substitution }
X(e) ? Θ
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E Proof search algorithm for entailments between specifications
Currently we have four rules for the judgement B1 ` B2, which are applied in the order we
present them. The first rule removes all the quantifiers on the RHS:
Remove∀Right
∀y.B ` B′[y ′\z ]
∀y.B ` ∀y ′.B′ z fresh
Soundness: The premise gives us ∀y.B ⇒ B′[y ′\z ] from which, using universal generali-
sation, we get ∀z.(∀y.B ⇒ B′[y ′\z ]). Using (41) we then derive ∀z.∀x.B ⇒ ∀z.B′[y ′\z ].
But z don’t appear in B, so we have just ∀y.B ⇒ ∀z.B′[y ′\z ]. Finally we rename the bound
variables z to y′ giving ∀y.B ⇒ ∀y′.B′ as required.
The second rule deals with disjunctions in the precondition of the triple on the right.
DisjPre
n∧
i=1
∀y.B ` {∃vi.Ai} · (t) {Q}
∀y.B ` {∃v1.A1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∃vn.An} · (t) {Q}
Soundness: By iterated application of Disjunction.
The third rule uses Skolemisation to deal with existential quantifiers in the precondition
of the specification on the right.
ExistsPre
∀y.B ` {A[v\a]} · (t) {Q}
∀y.B ` {∃v.A} · (t) {Q} a fresh
Soundness: By (Skolem).
The final rule uses the prover for `find-post to do most of the work (here A′ is just a spatial
conjunction but A,B can be any assertions):
TripleEnt
B `find-post {Φ} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υi
}
m∧
i=1
Υi[vi\ai] `Ii ∃bji .(Υ ′ji [wji\bji ]) ? Θ
pure
i
B ` {Φ} · (t)

m′∨
i=1
∃wi.Υ ′i

1. j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m′},
2. a1, . . . ,am all chosen fresh,
3. bj1 , . . . ,bjm′ all chosen fresh
4. Θ1, . . . , Θm pure
Soundness: We get from the first premise and the soundness of the proof system for `find-post
the following:
B ⇒ {Φ} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υi
}
We now need to check the well-formedness of the second premise, that is, we need to check that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have fv(Υi[vi\ai])∩bji = ∅. This is immediate from side condition 3.
Now, we can use the consequence rule to obtain our desired conclusion if we can show
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υi ⇒
m′∨
i=1
∃wi.Υ ′i
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This will follow if we can show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
∃vi.Υi ⇒ ∃wji .Υ ′ji
The above is equivalent to
∃vi.Υi ⇒ ∃bji .(Υ ′ji [wji\bji ])
because the variables bji are chosen fresh. Using skolemisation, and the fact that variables ai
are chosen fresh, it will be enough to show
Υi[vi\ai] ⇒ ∃bji .(Υ ′ji [wji\bji ])
The following argument shows this:
Υi[vi\ai]
⇒ {using the rule’s second premise}
∃bji .(Υ ′ji [wji\bji ]) ? Θ
pure
i
⇒ {by SplitPureLeft}
∃bji .(Υ ′ji [wji\bji ])
F Proof search algorithm for `find-post
The first rule we have for `find-post instantiates quantifiers on the LHS so that the parameters
in the two specifications match.
InstParam
(∀a . {P} · (t1, y, t2) {Q}) [y\t] `find-post {Φ} · (t1, t, t2)
{
Q′
}
∀a, y . {P} · (t1, y, t2) {Q} `find-post {Φ} · (t1, t, t2)
{
Q′
} t1 ∩ (a ∪ {y}) = ∅
(The side condition here makes sure that we instantiate the leftmost quantified parameter, to
make things more deterministic.)
Soundness: Follows from soundness of universal instantiation, that is, ∀u, y.A ⇒ ∀.u(A[y\e])
for any expression e.
The main rule for `find-post is the following one.
InferSpecForCall
Φ `I ∃uk,a.Υk ? Θ
∀a.
{
n∨
i=1
∃ui.Υi
}
· (p)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
}
`find-post {Φ} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
(∃vi.Υ ′i [a\I(a)] ? Θ)
}
1. t ∩ a = ∅,
2. fv(Φ) ∩ uk,a = ∅,
3. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have vi ∩ a = ∅
4. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, no formula in I(a) contains a variable from vi
5. k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
6. no formula in I(uk) contains a variable from a
7. uk ∩ a = ∅
backtracks
Note that after (InstParam) has been used to make the parameters match, some bound
variables may need to be renamed to fresh variables to allow the (InferSpecForCall) rule
to be used. We do not go into detail about these renamings.
Note also that, when called from (TripleEnt), this rule needs to backtrack in its choice of
k. If one choice of k fails, it is worth backtracking even if one had shown Φ `I ∃uk,x.Υk ?Θ,
because different choices of k might succeed with a different I, giving different instantiations
of the universally quantified variables a and thus different postconditions.
Soundness: For now we will assume that the following holds:
Υk[uk,a\I(uk,a)] ⇒ (∃uk.Υk) [a\I(a)] (40)
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We will come back and prove this at the end.
First we need to show that the entailment problem in the first premise is “well-formed”,
which means showing fv(Φ) ∩ ui,a = ∅. But this is just side condition 2. Then, we get to
assume that:
(a) Φ ⇒ Υi[ui,a\I(ui,a)] ? Θ
(b) fv(Θ) ⊆ fv(Φ)
(c) dom(I) = ui,a
We’ll need to use the following axiom scheme (which one finds in Hilbert systems):
∀x.(A⇒ B) ⇒ (∀x.A⇒ ∀x.B) (41)
We then reason as follows.
∀a.
{
n∨
i=1
∃ui.Υi
}
· (t)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
}
⇒ {consequence rule, universal generalisation and (41)}
∀a. {Υk} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
}
⇒ {instantiate a with I(a) and use side condition 1}
{(∃uk.Υk) [a\I(a)]} · (t)
{(
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υi
)
[a\I(a)]
}
⇒ {use shallow frame axiom to add Θ as a frame}
{(∃uk.Υk) [a\I(a)] ? Θ} · (t)
{(
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
)
[a\I(a)] ? Θ
}
⇒ {use consequence rule, (40) and monotonicity of ?}
{Υk[uk,a\I(uk,a)] ? Θ} · (t)
{(
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
)
[a\I(a)] ? Θ
}
⇒ {using consequence rule and (a) above}
{Φ} · (t)
{(
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i
)
[a\I(a)] ? Θ
}
⇒ {use side conditions 3 and 4}
{Φ} · (t)
{(
m∨
i=1
∃vi.Υ ′i [a\I(a)]
)
? Θ
}
⇒ {distribution of ∨ and ?}
{Φ} · (t)
{
m∨
i=1
(∃vi.Υi[a\I(a)] ? Θ)
}
To finish, we need to prove (40). Clearly we have
Υk[uk\I(uk)] ⇒ ∃uk.Υk
Then by universal generalisation we have
∀a.(Υk[uk\I(uk)] ⇒ ∃uk.Υk)
and then instantiating a with I(a) gives us
Υk[uk\I(uk)][a\I(a)] ⇒ (∃uk.Υk)[a\I(a)]
Thus we will be done if we can show that
Υk[uk\I(uk)][a\I(a)] ⇔ Υk[uk,a\I(uk,a)]
and this follows from side conditions 6 and 7.
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G Extended rules for `find-tr
FindGuidedUnfold
purify(closure(Ψi[vi\wi][x\e] ? P )) `SMT false for all i 6= k
Π,X(v)⇔ (∃v1.Ψ1) ∨ · · · ∨ (∃vn.Ψn) : Ψk[vk\wk][x\e] ? P `G
′
find-tr ∃y. e 7→ B(·) ? Rpure
Π,X(v)⇔ (∃v1.Ψ1) ∨ · · · ∨ (∃vn.Ψn) : X(e) ? P `Gfind-tr
∃y,wk. e 7→ B(·)
? purify(Ψk[vk\wk][x\e]) ? Rpure
w1, . . . ,wn fresh; G = unfold X(e?),G′; e?i ∈ {ei, ?}
FindGuidedSplit
recdef L(s, t, α) := Φ ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CK ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
P `I ∃c1, . . . , ck . (q1, . . . , qk) ∈ eˆγ ? Θ
S =

L(eˆ, s, α)
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CK , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, eˆ′, β)
? eˆγ = α ∪ {(e1, . . . , ek)} ∪ β
? E1 = e1 ? · · · ? Ek = ek

Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ Φ : S[s, n,v\w] ? P `G′find-tr ∃y. e 7→ B(·) ? Rpure
Π,L(x)⇔ Φ : L(eˆ, eˆ′, eˆγ) ? P `Gfind-tr ∃y, α, β,w. e 7→ B(·) ? purify(S[s, n,v\w]) ? Rpure
α, β,w fresh, c1, . . . , ck fresh,
G = split X e (p?),G′
each pi is a value expression or ,
each qi is
{
ci if pi is ?
pi otherwise
,
each ei is
{
I(ci) if pi is ?
pi otherwise
H Soundness of Rules for `find-tr
H.1 Soundness of Find
Find
P `SMT e′A = eA + o
Π : P ? eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, B,Co+1, . . .Cn `εfind-tr e′A 7→ B
We know by soundness of `SMT that
P ⇒ e′A = eA + o (42)
and need to show that Π |= P ? eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, B,Co+1, . . .Cn ⇒ e′A 7→ B ? Υ for some
appropriate Υ .
P ? eA 7→ C0, . . . ,Co−1, B,Co+1, . . .Cn
⇒ { (7→-Group), (?-Monotonicity) }
P ? eA 7→ C0 ? . . . ? eA + n 7→ Cn
⇒ { by (SplitPureRight), (?-Monotonicity), and (42) }
P ? e′A = eA + o ? eA 7→ C0 ? . . . ? eA + n 7→ Cn
⇒ { by equational reasoning, (SplitPureLeft), (?-Monotonicity) }
P ? eA 7→ C0 ? . . . ? eA + o− 1 7→ Co−1 ? e 7→ B ?
? eA + o+ 1 7→ Co+1 ? . . . ? eA + n 7→ Cn
⇒ { (?-Commutative) }
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e′A 7→ B ? Υ
where Υ ≡ P ? eA 7→ C0 ? . . . ? eA+o−1 7→ Co−1 ? eA+o+1 7→ Co+2 ? . . . ? eA+n 7→ Cn.
H.2 Soundness of FindUnfold
FindUnfold
purify(closure(Ψi[vi\wi][v\E] ? P )) `SMT false for all i 6= k
Π,X(v)⇔ ∃v1.Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃vn.Ψn : Ψk[vk\wk][v\E] ? P `εfind-tr ∃y. eA 7→ B ? Rpure
Π,X(v)⇔ ∃v1.Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃vn.Ψn : X(E) ? P `εfind-tr ∃y,wk. eA 7→ B
? purify(Ψk[vk\wk][v\E])
?Rpure
w1, . . . ,wn fresh
Note that the first hypothesis of the rule is just there to make the rule deterministic.
By the first assumption and soundness of `SMT we know that
purify(closure(Ψi[vi\wi][v\E] ? P ))⇔ false for all i 6= k (43)
The following lemma can be simply derived from the laws for puriy and closure:
Lemma 11 If purify(closure(A))⇔ false then A⇔ false.
From Lemma 11 and (43) it follows that Ψi[vi\wi][v\E] ? P ⇔ false for all i 6= k and thus
∃vi. Ψi[v\E] ? P ⇔ false for all i 6= k (44)
By the soundness of the second assumption (using induction hypothesis) we know that
Π,X(v)⇒ ∃v1.Ψ1∨· · ·∨∃vn.Ψn |= Ψk[vk\wk][v\E] ? P ⇔ ∃y. eA 7→ B ? Rpure ? Υ ′ (45)
for some Υ ′ and need to show that
X(v)⇔∃v1.Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃vn.Ψn |=
X(E) ? P ⇔ ∃y,wk. eA 7→ B(·) ? purify(Ψk[vk\wk][v\E]) ? Rpure ? Υ
for some appropriate Υ . We reason as follows:
X(E) ? P
⇒ {(PredLeft)}
(∃v1.Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃vn.Ψn)[v\E] ? P
⇒ { by the ? distribution rules ∨ and ∃ and (?-Monotonicity) }
(∃v1.Ψ1[v\E] ? P ) ∨ · · · ∨ (∃vn.Ψn[v\E] ? P )
⇒ { by (44)}
∃vk.Ψk[v\E] ? P
It therefore remains to show
∃vk.Ψk[v\E] ? P ⇒ ∃y,wk. eA 7→ B ? purify(Ψk[vk\wk][v\E]) ? Rpure ? Υ (46)
for some Υ . For the remainder, first note that the following logical rule (which is standard):
∀∃
∀x.A⇒ B
(∃x.A)⇒ (∃x.B)
To prove (46) by the (∀∃) rule it thus suffices to show (as wk are fresh):
Ψk[vk\wk][v\E] ? P ⇒ ∃y. eA 7→ B ? purify(Ψk[vk\wk][v\E]) ? Rpure ? Υ (47)
choosing Υ to be Υ ′ this follows from (45).
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H.3 Soundness of FindSplit
FindSplit
recdef L(s, t, α) := Q ∈ LsegDefn(n,v, [C1, . . . ,CK ], [A1, . . . , AN ], [E1, . . . , Ek])
P `I ∃u1, . . . , uk . (u1, . . . , uk) ∈ eˆγ ? Θ
S =

L(eˆ, s, α)
? s 7→ C1, . . . ,CK , n
? A1 ? · · · ? AN
? L(n, eˆ′, β)
? eˆγ = α ∪ {(I(u1), . . . , I(uk))} ∪ β
? E1 = I(u1) ? · · · ? Ek = I(uk)

Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ Q : S[s, n,v\w] ? P `εfind-tr ∃y. eA 7→ B ? Rpure
Π,L(s, t, α)⇔ Q : L(eˆ, eˆ′, eˆγ) ? P `find-tr ∃y,w, α, β. eA 7→ B ? purify(S[s, n,v\w]) ? Rpure
α, β,w fresh, u1, . . . , uk fresh
By the first assumption and soundness of `I we know that
P ⇒ (I(u1), . . . , I(uk)) ∈ eˆγ ? Θ (48)
From (48) we get P ⇒ (I(u1), . . . , I(uk)) ∈ eˆγ ? true and thus by (?-SplitPureRight)
P ⇒ P ? (I(u1), . . . , I(uk)) ∈ eˆγ (49)
The second assumption by induction yields:
S[s, n,v\w] ? P ⇒ ∃y. eA 7→ B ? Rpure ? Υ (50)
for some Υ . First we reason as follows:
L(eˆ, eˆ′, eˆγ) ? P
⇒ { (by (49), (?-Monotonicity),(?-Commutativity) }
L(eˆ, eˆ′, eˆγ) ? (I(u1), . . . , I(uk)) ∈ eˆγ ? P
⇒ { by (Split) and (?-Monotonicity) }
∃s, n,v, α, β.S ? P
Using (∀∃) again it just remains to show (note that α and β are already fresh by assumption
and thus need not be substituted):
S[s, n,v\w] ? P ⇒ ∃y. eA 7→ B ? purify(S[s, n,v\w]) ? Rpure ? Υ (51)
for some Υ . By (Purify) and (?-Monotonicity) it suffices to show
S[s, n,v\w] ? purify(S[s, n,v\w]) ? P ⇒ ∃y. e 7→ B ? purify(S[s, n,v\w]) ? Rpure ? Υ (52)
for some Υ and by (?-Commutativity) and (?-Monotonicity) this holds if we can prove that
S[s, n,v\w] ? P ⇒ ∃y. eA 7→ B ? Rpure ? Υ (53)
for some Υ which follows from (50).
I Detailed steps of the entailment prover
Here we show how the unfolded strong specifications can be folded up into the weak variations,
as performed in main and discussed in Section 6.5. The proof starts with symbolic state
obtained at the point just before the unfold ghost statement executes.
Symbolic execution proofs for higher order store programs 85
{$ListLibraryStrong(lookupL, addPairL, disposeL, createL) ? res 7→ }
ghost unfold $ListLibraryStrong(?, ?, ?, ?);
Unfold
lookupL 7→ . . . ? disposeL 7→ . . . ? createL 7→ . . .
? addPairL 7→ ∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
? res 7→

ghost fold $ListLibraryWeak(?, ?, ?, ?);
fold (see section I.1 below. Finds frame res 7→ )
{$ListLibraryWeak(lookupL, addPairL, createL, disposeL) ? res 7→ }
I.1 Entailment steps for the (GhostFold) rule
For the fold, using the defintion of $ListLibraryWeak we are trying to prove
lookupL 7→ . . . ? disposeL 7→ . . . ? createL 7→ . . .
? addPairL 7→ ∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
? res 7→
`
∃a0, a1, a2, a3.
a0 7→ . . . ? a1 7→ . . . ? a2 7→ . . .
? a3 7→ ∀al , key, value.{ ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ)
? $Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ) }
Applied (InstMatchAddr) [Instantiating a3 with addPairL]
lookupL 7→ . . . ? disposeL 7→ . . . ? createL 7→ . . .
? addPairL 7→ ∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
? res 7→
`
∃a0, a1, a2.
a0 7→ . . . ? a1 7→ . . . ? a2 7→ . . .
? addPairL 7→ ∀al , key, value.{ ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ)
? $Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ) }
Applied (CancelPtTriple) (see section I.2 below).
lookupL 7→ . . . ? disposeL 7→ . . . ? createL 7→ . . . ? res 7→
`
∃a0, a1, a2. a0 7→ . . . ? a1 7→ . . . ? a2 7→ . . .
Applied (InstMatchAddr) and (CancelPtTriple) in a similar way for instantiations
[a2 := createL, a1 := disposeL, a0 := lookupL]
res 7→ ` emp
Applying (Pure) to finish, we have found the frame res 7→ .
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I.2 Entailment steps for the application of (CancelPtTriple) with addPairL
For this, we need to prove
∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
`
∀al , key, value.{ ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ)
? $Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { ∃κ. $AssocListH (al ;κ) }
Applied (Remove∀Right)
∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
` { ∃κ. $AssocListH (al0;κ)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{ ∃κ.
$AssocListH (al0;κ)
}
Applied (ExistsPre)
∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
` {
$AssocListH (al0;κ0)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{ ∃κ.
$AssocListH (al0;κ)
}
Applied (TripleEnt) (see the two separate parts below)
I.2.1 Trying to relate preconditions (first premise).
Trying to prove
∀al , key, value, κ.{
$AssocListH (al ;κ)
?$Rel(key, value)
}
·(al , key, value) { $AssocListH (al ; {key} ∪ κ) }
`find-post {
$AssocListH (al0;κ0)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{
?
}
Applied (InstParam)
∀κ.{
$AssocListH (al0;κ)
?$Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{
$AssocListH (al0; {key0} ∪ κ)
}
`find-post {
$AssocListH (al0;κ0)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{
?
}
Applied (InferSpecForCall) (see steps below)
∀κ.{
$AssocListH (al0;κ)
?$Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{
$AssocListH (al0; {key0} ∪ κ)
}
`find-post {
$AssocListH (al0;κ0)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
}
·(al0, key0, value0)
{
$AssocListH (al0; {key0} ∪ κ0)
}
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This completes proof of first premise, and found postcondition:
$AssocListH (al0; {key0} ∪ κ0)
Showing premise for (InferSpecForCall). Trying to prove
$AssocListH (al0;κ0)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
` ∃κ. $AssocListH (al0;κ)
? $Rel(key0, value0)
Applied (InstMatchArg) [κ := κ0], (CancelPred)
$Rel(key0, value0) ` $Rel(key0, value0)
Applied (CancelPred)
emp ` emp
(Pure) completes the entailment. There is no frame left over, so the generated postcondition
is simply the postcondition from the LHS, after substituting with the discovered instantiation
[κ := κ0]:
$AssocListH (al0; {key0} ∪ κ0)
I.2.2 Trying to relate postconditions (second premise).
Trying to prove
$AssocListH (al0; {key0} ∪ κ0) ` ∃κ1.$AssocListH (al0;κ1)
Applied (InstMatchArg) [κ1 := {key0} ∪ κ0], (CancelPred)
emp ` emp
(Pure) completes postconditions.
